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Introduction 
 
“The Government can only welcome the fact that a powerful Dutch Company is doing the job, which 
can in the first place be expected of the Dutch, namely the further exploitation and cultivation of our 
possessions, which surely should be regarded as an imperative requirement of this time, and posed to a 
Colonial Power.” 1 
 
This was the main reason for the creation of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate, as described 
by Johannes Marinus in his memorandum of 1911. This Syndicate was founded in 1910 by 
Johannes Marinus and Hendrikus Colijn. Marinus first arrived in the Dutch East Indies when 
he started working for the Deli Spoorweg Maatschappij (Deli Railway Company). He learned 
quickly and made a fortune by investing in tobacco plantations in the East Coast of Sumatra 
residency.2 In 1909 he decided to start his own company.3 His idea: a private company with a 
national purpose. By this he meant to stimulate the development of the outer islands of the 
Archipelago via the Syndicate, while receiving financial advantages from the State in return. In 
his memorandum, Marinus stated the three main points on which the company was founded. 
These were firstly “because of the great love for our beautiful Indian possessions.” Secondly, 
“by the urge to give a powerful boost to the exploitation of the vast area of fertile soil, which 
has been waiting for cultivation for too long.” Lastly, “To create a large Dutch (National) 
Company, in addition to the many very large Foreign Companies, so that we at least remain in 
our own colonies a dignified figure in an area in which the Dutch certainly do not have to lag 
behind any Foreign Power.”4 
Marinus not only got the interest of Colijn, who was a member of the Dutch House of 
Representatives and former military officer in the Dutch colonial army, but also from Johannes 
van Heutsz, former governor-general of the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, two important 
companies were also interested in this new plan, and these were the Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij (Netherlands Trading Society) and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. During the first 
 
1 “de Regeering kan niet anders dan toejuichen dat eene krachtige Nederlandsche Maatschappy het werk doet, dat 
toch in de eerste plaats van Nederlanders verwacht kan worden, namelijk het verder ontginnen en in cultuur 
brengen onzer bezittingen, hetwelk toch zeker als een gebiedende eisch des tyds beschouwd moet worden, en 
gesteld wordt aan eene Koloniale Mogendheid.” in: Nl-HaNA, Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (N.H.M.), 
nummer toegang 2.20.01, inventarisnummer 11725, 05-02-1911. 
2 This is known today as the province North Sumatra. 
3 H.H. van Kol, Het Nederlandsch-Indisch Land-Syndicaat. Met een “Open Brief” van H. Colijn tot den schrijver 
gericht, en diens “Antwoord” (Amsterdam 1921), 12; T. de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, Geschiedenis 
van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824-1964 (Amsterdam 2012), appendix 3, 41. 
4 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11725, 05-02-1911. 
Introduction 
 
2 
 
meeting where the memorandum and articles of association were designed on the 9th of June 
1910, six men were present. The initial founders of the plan J.H. Marinus and H. Colijn. From 
the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, directors H.W. Deterding, jhr. H. Loudon and A.J. Cohen Stuart. 
Representing the N.H.M., director C.J.K. van Aalst. These men each bought five shares worth 
ƒ10.000,- per share, a total of ƒ300.000,- in a starting share capital of ƒ1.000.000,-.5 Colijn 
started with the search for new shareholders, and he was very successful. This led to an 
amendment of the articles of association in October 1911. The share capital of the Syndicate 
was extended to ƒ10.000.000,-, divided in 90 shares A of ƒ5.000,- each and 9.550 shares B of 
ƒ1.000,- each. All shares A and 3.550 shares B were subscribed.6 Notable shareholders were: 
the De Rothschild Frères company who owned ten shares A and 1.318 shares B, the Rothschild 
& Sons company who owned 250 shares B, and the Netherlands Trading Society who owned 
ten shares A and 990 shares B. The De Rothschild Frères were represented by L.A. Auerbach 
as commissioner, while the Rothschild & Sons were represented by F. Lane.7 
While the Syndicate does not seem exceptional when compared to other companies in 
the Dutch East Indies, it does become a rather interesting case study because of three reasons. 
The first reason is the idea of the Syndicate. As already mentioned, the Syndicate not only had 
a financial goal, but also an idealistic set up. Marinus and Colijn saw the Syndicate as a national 
cause and wanted to form a counterweight against the foreign companies that were operating 
in the Dutch East Indies. This is rather interesting, since most of the investments in the company 
came from foreign investors such as the De Rothschilds. Furthermore, the founders hoped that 
the development of the Syndicate would lead to further development and innovation on the 
Outer Islands of the Archipelago.  
The second reason is the functioning of the Syndicate, and is related to the first. One of 
the main purposes was the cultivation and exploitation of the land that had not been cultivated 
yet in all parts of the Indonesian Archipelago. The company had no physical boundaries for the 
application of land concessions, and its directors were willing to become concedes for all the 
unexploited plots of land all over the Archipelago. This resulted in the fact that the directors 
were forced to develop and manage a company which operated in three different provinces on 
the island of Sumatra, namely East-Sumatra, Palembang, and Bencoolen. 
The third and last reason is the relationship the Syndicate developed with the Dutch 
political world back in the Netherlands. The Syndicate provoked a fair amount of political 
 
5 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11725, Statutes of Incorporation, 1910, art. 1. 
6 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11726, Articles of Association, 1911, art. 4. 
7 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11746, List of Shareholders, 1917. 
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uproar. During the first years of the company’s existence, it was managed by high ranking 
political figures such as Colijn and van Heutsz. Many politicians in the Dutch House of 
Representatives and Senate argued that there was a conflict of interest between politics and 
business. Furthermore, these politicians argued that these men were influencing local politics 
for not only the Syndicate, but also for their own benefit. Next to the political uproar it created 
back home, the Syndicate also tried to gain financial and political advantages in the Dutch East 
Indies. Both the directors and commissioners of the company, especially those who used to be 
elected officials, tried to lobby the colonial officials to gain these advantages. 
These three reasons combined bring up an interesting question. The directors and 
commissioners of the Syndicate not only had to manage the economic and financial aspects of 
a company, they also had to keep in mind the idealistic set up this company had as well as the 
political uproar it created. So the question arises: was the Syndicate able to manage the 
confluence of these three elements (financial/economic, idealistic and political)? This thesis 
seeks to answer this question in three different chapters. The first chapter will focus on the 
financial and idealistic set up of the Syndicate. It will describe who was involved with the 
founding of the company, who were the shareholders, and how its managerial structure 
developed. Furthermore, a comparison between the Dutch East India Land Syndicate and other 
syndicates in the Archipelago will be made. The second chapter will describe the day-to-day 
activities of the Syndicate, as described as its main goal in the articles of association:  
 
1. “[…] to acquire land in all parts of the Dutch East Indies, either via lease or rent, 
or in the form of agricultural concessions or otherwise and, in connection 
therewith, the formation, management, exploitation and promotion of cultural 
enterprises in the broadest sense, and the sale of agricultural products, both for 
its own account and for third parties;” 
2. “The alienation of concessions or rights on concession, whether by sale or other 
means […];” 
3. “[…] to participate in or otherwise become financially involved in other 
companies or enterprises, that envisage the same goal or promote the purpose 
[of the Syndicate].8 
 
8 “[…] het verkrijgen van gronden in alle deelen van den Nederlandsch-Indischen Archipel, hetzij in erfpacht of 
huur, dan wel onder den vorm van landbouwconcessies of op andere wijze en, in verband daarmede, het vormen, 
beheeren, exploiteeren en bevorderen van cultuurondernemingen in den meest uitgebreiden zin, de verkoop van 
landbouwproducten voor eigen rekening als voor rekening van derden; De vervreemding van gronden of rechten 
op gronden, hetzij door verkoop dan wel op andere wijze […]; om deel te nemen in of zich op andere wijze 
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Based on this, a more thorough analysis is given on how the company created, exploited and 
managed its plantations; on how it obtained, developed and sold concessions; and on how it 
financially participated in other companies. Furthermore, an analysis will be made on how the 
company tried to stimulate innovation and development in the rest of the Archipelago, and thus 
serve a ‘national cause’. The third and last chapter will analyse the political context in which 
the Syndicate was founded and how it created the political uproar that came with it. It will also 
analyse how the commissioners lobbied for financial advantages and how they tried to gain 
exceptions from legislation. 
 
Although the question on how the Syndicate managed the confluence of the three different 
elements is a small one in- and of itself, it does touch upon some current debates in the 
historiography of the late colonial Dutch East Indies. Two historiographic debates within the 
history of the Dutch East Indies are important here: whether or not the Netherlands can be seen 
as an imperialistic entity and how the economy developed in the Archipelago. 
Marinus and Colijn came up with the idea for a ‘private national’ company in 1908. 
This was at a time when the Indonesian Archipelago was not yet fully controlled by the Dutch. 
In the north-western part of the island of Sumatra, the Dutch government was taking military 
actions to gain control over the province of Aceh. These actions had already started in 1873, 
and only ended officially in 1914.9 This idealistic set up of Marinus and Colijn can be seen as 
fitting for that time. In 1901 the term ‘Ethical Policy’ was introduced in the Queen’s Speech. 
All political parties in the Netherlands agreed that something had to be done to provide a better 
living for the indigenous population of the Indonesian Archipelago. Military intervention and 
conquest had to be followed by an unselfish policy that should lead to an improvement of the 
material and mental state of the subjugated indigenous population; slavery had to disappear, 
order and safety guaranteed, and prosperity brought to the subdued population.10 This policy 
was seen as a guideline for Dutch imperial governance in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, as well as a dividing line between the ‘old nineteenth’ and the ‘new twentieth’ century 
in the Dutch East Indies.11 Moreover, it was the main legitimatization for the Dutch 
 
financieel te interesseeren bij andere vennootschappen of ondernemingen, die een gelijk doel beoogen of haar 
doel kunnen bevorderen” in: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11726, Articles of Association, 1911, art. 2. 
9 For a detailed account on the Aceh war see: P. van ’t Veer, de Atjeh-oorlog, (Amsterdam 1969) and J. Kreemer, 
Atjeh: Algemeen samenvattend overzicht van land en volk van Atjeh en onderhoorigheden, eerste deel (Leiden 
1923). 
10 J. van Goor, ‘Imperialisme in de marge?’ in: J. van Goor e.a., Imperialisme in de marge: De Afronding van 
Nederlands-Indië (Utrecht 1985), 9-18, there 10. 
11 C. Fasseur e.a., Imperialisme en Ethische Politiek (Leiden 1983), 3. 
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administrative expansion in the Outer Islands and to see it as different from other ‘imperialistic’ 
colonial powers.12  
From the beginning of the 1970s, however, a debate has started about whether or not 
the Netherlands can be seen as an imperialistic entity during the turn of the nineteenth to the 
twentieth century. In the international debate on imperialism, the Netherlands was never a prime 
example. Hannah Arendt described Dutch imperialism as atypical, a mixture between French 
and English imperialism. Continuous expansion was not present, and it was rather a 
consolidation and modernisation of already owned territory.13 Ivo Schöffer adds that the Dutch 
were able to consolidate because they were doing so in a relatively safe environment, meaning 
that there were no other European imperialist entities present in the area of the Archipelago. 
Jurrien van Goor described this as ‘imperialism in the margin’; the rounding-off of empire and 
the consolidation of Dutch colonial rule.14 Furthermore, Schöffer also states that “Dutch 
nationalism […] was too weak to give strong support for empire-building overseas”.15 Cees 
Fasseur adds that not only nationalism was absent, but also the urge to conquer new territories 
or the search for new markets for export were missing in the case of the Dutch East Indies.16 
Opposing almost all of these arguments is Maarten Kuitenbrouwer. He states that there 
are two characteristics of imperialism which are applicable to the case of the Dutch East Indies, 
namely contiguity and pre-emption. He sees this, respectively, as the extension of 
administrative authority from older settlements, and the preventive occupation of new 
territories because of nationalist rivalries with other countries.17 Elsbeth Locher-Scholten adds 
to this the argument that the Dutch decision-making process “preceding military expeditions 
brings to light an array of motives behind Dutch expansion in the Indies that fits in with theories 
of modern imperialism”.18 Refuting these arguments, Henk Wesseling states that contiguity in 
this case does not apply, because the Dutch did not reach out for new areas in the world. Instead, 
 
12 E. Locher-Scholten, ‘Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago Around 1900 and the Imperialism 
Debate’ in: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol.25, nr.1 (Singapore 1994), 91-111, there 91. 
13 H. Arendt, Imperialism, part two of the origins of Totalitarianism (New York 1968), 10-12. 
14 van Goor, Imperialisme in de marge, 16. 
15 I. Schöffer, ‘Dutch Expansion and Indonesian Reactions: Some Dilemmas of Modern Colonial Rule (1900-
1942)’ in: H.L. Wesseling & F. Braudel, Expansion and reaction: essays on European expansion and reaction in 
Asia and Africa, (Leiden 1978), 78-99, there 80. 
16 C. Fasseur, ‘Een koloniale paradox: de Nederlandse expansie in de Indonesische archipel in het midden van de 
negentiende eeuw (1830-1870)’ in: Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis, vol.92 (1979), 162-186, there 163. 
17 M. Kuitenbrouwer, Nederland en de opkomst van het moderne imperialisme. Koloniën en buitenlandse 
politiek (Amsterdam 1985). 
18 Locher-Scholten, Dutch Expansion in the Indonesian Archipelago, 91. 
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he argues that colonial policies were not changed because of the expansion in the Outer Islands 
of the Archipelago, thus becoming a case of continuity instead of contiguity.19  
Next to the debate about Dutch imperialism in general, historians have focussed on the 
economic aspect of Dutch imperialism. One argument made by Arendt was that private 
investment, which she calls ‘the prime mover of imperialist movement’, was slow to get started 
in the Dutch East Indies.20 Theo van Tijn agrees with this, but adds that this private economic 
interest still can be seen as the primary factor for the development of a ‘Dutch imperialistic 
mentality’. The more economic interests in the Archipelago grew, the more the Dutch State had 
to do to create a safe environment for these interests.21 Bridging the gap between the two 
standpoints Thomas Lindblad argues that there is an interaction between intensification of 
actual control and economic development in the Dutch East Indies.22 He states: “the vast 
economic potential of the Outer Islands could not have been realized without an appreciable 
degree of consolidated Dutch rule. The growth path itself provided a powerful impetus to 
sustained State formation.”23 
So, according to Lindblad, Dutch expansion in the Archipelago went hand in hand with 
growing private interest, often alternating and reinforcing each other. In this context, the 
Syndicate seems to be a relevant case study because it tries to combine financial, idealistic and 
political goals. For this reason, it is important to discuss some aspects of the economic 
development of the Dutch East Indies. 
 From the beginning of the 1990s, historians have gained an interest in many aspects 
related to economic development in the Archipelago. Comparing the Syndicate to the 
arguments that are made by historians on the larger economic studies on the Archipelago would 
be unwise, since these arguments are too generalized. 24 There are, however, some specific 
studies that are relevant in the case of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate. As already 
mentioned, the Syndicate operated in three different provinces (or residencies) on the island of 
Sumatra, namely East-Sumatra, Palembang, and Bencoolen. According to historians, these 
 
19 H.L. Wesseling, ‘The Giant that was a Dwarf or the Strange History of Dutch Imperialism’ in: A Porter & R. 
Holland, Theory and Practice of European Expansion Overseas (London 1989), 60-72, there 64. 
20 Arendt, Imperialism, 7. 
21 Th. Van Tijn, ‘Een nabeschouwing’ in: BMGN: Low Countries Historical Review, vol.86. nr.1 (1971), 79-89, 
there 85. 
22 J.Th. Lindblad, ‘Economic Aspects of the Dutch Expansion in Indonesia, 1870-1914’ in: Modern Asian 
Studies, vol.23, nr.1 (1989), 1-23, there 5. 
23Lindblad, Economic Aspects, 23. 
24 See for instance: A. Maddison & G. Prince, Economic Growth in Indonesia 1820-1940 (Leiden 1989); A. 
Booth, The Indonesian Economy in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A History of Missed Opportunities 
(Palgrave 2001); J. Luiten van Zanden & D. Marks, An Economic History of Indonesia 1800-2012 (Routledge 
2012); A. Schrikker & J.L. Touwen, Promises and Predicaments, Trade and Entrepreneurship in Colonial and 
Independent Indonesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Singapore 2015). 
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provinces can be grouped in different clusters. These differed not only in size or population, 
but also in export and import capacity, trade surplus, and types of production.  
Lindblad and Clemens clustered the islands not only within the geographic context of 
the Archipelago but also in the economic structure of the different provinces, while also taking 
into account European and indigenous production. They identified five clusters. In cluster one, 
economic expansion is driven by Western entrepreneurs, and includes the provinces of East-
Sumatra, Riau, Bangka and Belitung. The second cluster is comprised of provinces where 
economic development lagged behind other regions in the Outer Islands, and includes Aceh, 
the Westcoast of Sumatra, Tapanuli, and Bencoolen. The third cluster includes Jambi, 
Palembang, and Lampung. In this cluster, economic expansion is driven by a combination of 
indigenous and Western entrepreneurship. The fourth cluster in made up by both residencies on 
the island of Borneo, Southeast Kalimantan and West Kalimantan because of a thinly populated 
inland. The last cluster comprises the islands in the eastern part of the Archipelago; South 
Sulawesi, Manado, Bali, Maluku, and the Lesser Sunda Islands. This cluster is characterized by 
stagnation.25  
In a later publication, Lindblad devised two new forms of clustering, one that was based 
on the sheer value of foreign exports and imports, and one that calculated the surplus on the 
balance of trade of each residency as a percentage of export revenues. Based on the value of 
foreign export and import, Lindblad describes four clusters: East-Sumatra, the other provinces 
of Sumatra, both residencies on the island of Borneo, and the rest. His latter clustering produces 
five clusters that differed a lot from the others: 1. Regions that displayed a deficit rather than a 
surplus (Aceh, Tapanuli, West Sumatra, and Bencoolen); 2. South Sulawesi and Maluku with 
a surplus below the overall average; 3. West Kalimantan and Manado, regions with a surplus a 
little below average; 4. East Sumatra, Palembang, Jambi, and the Lesser Sunda Islands, regions 
with an average or higher surplus percentage; 5. Southeast Kalimantan and Riau, provinces 
with a surplus percentage above average.26 
Jeroen Touwen, in his dissertation on the economic development of the Outer Islands of 
the Archipelago, saw some flaws in these clusters. For the first clustering, he argues that 
 
25 J.Th. Lindblad, ‘De opkomst van de Buitengewesten’ in: A.H.P. Clemens & J.Th. Lindblad, Het belang van de 
Buitengewesten: Economische expansie en koloniale staatsvorming in de Buitengewesten van Nederlands-Indië 
1870-1942 (Amsterdam 1989), 1-37, there 17-20; A.H.P. Clemens, ‘Regional patterns in the foreign trade of the 
Outer Provinces, 1911-1940’ in: A.H.P. Clemens, J.Th. Lindblad & L.J. Touwen, Changing economy in 
Indonesia: a selection of statistical source material from the early 19th century up to 1940. Vol 12b: Regional 
patterns in foreign trade, 1911-1940 (Amsterdam 1992), 33-45. 
26 J.Th. Lindblad, ‘The process of economic development in the Outer Provinces of the Dutch East Indies’, in: 
Journal of the Japan-Netherlands Institute, vol.2 (1990), 208-234, there 218-222. 
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although geographically close together, the economic structures of these residencies differed 
greatly. On the cluster of trade balances, Touwen argued that it makes it difficult to draw a line 
between different clusters. Instead, he chose to ignore geographic location and instead focus on 
two different criteria. He incorporated the dualist approach, that is to which extent the European 
and/or Asian sector dominated the economy and the outlook of economic performance (the 
increase in income and prosperity, construction of infrastructure, and provision of social capital, 
schools and hospitals. He divides the provinces in four clusters: 1. East-Sumatra, Palembang, 
and Southeast Kalimantan, which both had European and indigenous export production; 2. 
Provinces which were dominated by indigenous production: Aceh, West Sumatra, Jambi, 
Lampung, West Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and Manado; 3. Bangka, Belitung and Riau, 
where European export production dominated and lastly 4. Provinces where little to no 
economic expansion took place: Tapanuli, Bencoolen, Bali, Timor and Dependencies, and 
Maluku.27 Although all of these clusters were formed from different viewpoints, it can be 
assumed that Bencoolen differed from the other two provinces the Syndicate was working in. 
It had a deficit on its balance of trade, and there was almost no economic expansion. Since 
economic development was one of the key goals of the company, it is interesting to see if the 
directors adopted a different strategy in these different provinces to promote innovation and 
development.  
The founders of the Syndicate were not only interested in the development of their 
enterprise alone, but also in providing a boost to other development and innovation in these 
provinces. Students of economic development in the Dutch East Indies have used spillovers and 
linkages to see if foreign private investment lead to further economic development in colonial 
Indonesia. Spillovers can result from foreign firms entering the local market and thereby 
demonstrating new technologies or providing technical assistance, which results in 
technological improvement and an increase in productivity for local firms or the indigenous 
population.28 According to Kokko, this can be done deliberately by transferring technology 
from foreign companies to host country companies, or by technological diffusion, which is the 
technological distribution through observation by another party.29 Two students of economic 
development in the Outer Islands have dubbed the effects of spillovers in the Archipelago as 
 
27 J.L. Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago: Trade and economic development in the Outer Islands of 
Indonesia 1900-1942 (Leiden 2001), 59-65. 
28 A. Kokko, ‘Technology, market characteristics, and spillovers’ in: Journal of Development Economics, vol.43 
(1994), 279-293, there 279. 
29 A. Kokko, Foreign Direct Investment, Host Country Characteristics, and Spillovers, (Stockholm 1992), 19-
21. 
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insignificant. Thee Kian-Wie argues that foreign Dutch firms did not stimulate the rise of 
peasant rubber culture in Sumatra and Borneo, but that it was done by Chinese traders located 
in Singapore who gave demonstrations to the locals.30 Furthermore, Touwen argues that 
development of foreign firms failed to produce the development of local import substitution.31 
However recently, Frank Ochsendorf has provided two cases in which these spillovers did take 
place. Tea estates in West Java supplied local peasants in the area with material and knowledge 
to produce tea, and in Southeast Kalimantan, local smallholders were observing rubber estates 
to improve their productivity.32 
Apart from spillovers, historians have also used linkages when discussing economic 
growth in the Archipelago. In 1958, Albert Hirschman introduced the idea of ‘forward and 
backward’ linkages. Backward linkage means when development of a given company 
stimulates development of another company because the latter can supply inputs to the first, for 
instance the purchase of building materials from local companies instead of importing these. 
Forward linkage means that the output of a company leads to the development of local 
industries which use this output as their input, for instance the processing of raw materials such 
as tea and rubber. In short, the additional effects created by linkages stimulate the local 
economic development.33 Thee Kian-Wie added to this the ‘final demand’ linkage.34 When a 
company requires input of primary economic factors, such as labour or capital, this leads to 
increased income for these labourers and creates an increase in consumptive demand. Touwen 
has dubbed this as an ‘indirect backward linkage’.35 He has also shown that backward linkages 
were more important than forward linkages in economic development in the Archipelago. The 
most notable of these is the development of infrastructure, such as the Deli Railway on the 
island of Sumatra, an increased demand for food and construction materials generated by the 
European export industry, and the increased consumption due to wages payed to local 
labourers.36  
Next to spillovers and linkages, historians have also used another method to explore the 
impact of Dutch private investment on the economic development in late colonial Indonesia. 
 
30 T. Kian-Wie, Plantation Agriculture and Export Growth: an economic history of East-Sumatra, 1863-1942 
(Jakarta 1977), 18 
31 Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 159-160. 
32 F. Ochsendorf, Foreign capital and indigenous economic development in Indonesia, Spillovers and linkages in 
a colonial setting (Leiden 2016), 2-8. 
33 A.O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (Yale 1958), 98-100. 
34 Kian-Wie, Plantation Agriculture and Export Growth, 50; M. Watkins, ‘A Staple Theory of Economic 
Growth’ in: The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol.29, no.2 (1963), 141-158, there 145. 
35 Touwen, Extremes in the Archipelago, 33. 
36 Ibidem, 158-158; Ochsendorf, Foreign capital and indigenous economic development in Indonesia, 8-15. 
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Drawing from a directory, a yearbook with information on several thousand companies in 
Indonesia, companies incorporated under Dutch law, Lindblad, Ochsendorf and Van de Water 
created a balance sheet of foreign direct investment in colonial Indonesia.37 They differentiated 
between gains that went to overseas shareholders and possible benefits and losses for the local 
economy and society, and argued that most of the profit was collected by shareholders, while 
only a small percentage was used for local development.38 In another article based on this 
database, Lindblad discusses profitability and strategy of Dutch companies in colonial 
Indonesia during the 1920s. Using divided rates as an approximation, he shows differences 
between sectors and branches of industry, as well as ‘the lack of a systematic relationship 
between size and profitability among firms’.39 Furthermore, following up on this analysis and 
using the database as the main source, he argues that the average rate of return from companies 
in Indonesia was 9.3%, which was higher than the average of 6% that was common for 
shareholders in the Netherlands. He states that there was no presence of a ‘colonial drain’, as 
some historians have argued.40 
By having a quick look on the archive of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate, there is 
evidence that the company created its own spillovers and linkages. The directors organized a 
congress for fibre production in 1911, at which they wanted to present new found technologies 
and change experiences with different fibre companies in the Archipelago.41 Another example 
of what might be spillovers are: the testing of new machinery on their plantations, the 
development of new machinery for fibre production, and the sharing of patent on the processing 
of tea leaves.42 The yearly records also show that the Syndicate was investing in local 
infrastructure. This thesis seeks to find out if this was only for their own benefit or if it also 
benefited the local population through larger infrastructural projects, and thus can be seen as a 
backward linkage. Lastly, the articles of association of the Syndicate note that the yearly rate 
of return is six per cent on average. This could differ if the profit was lower or higher than 
expected. A more thorough analysis is needed to find out if there was profit in the first place. 
 
37 Handboek voor cultuur- en handelsondernemingen in Nederlands-Indië (Amsterdam 1888-1940). It includes 
information on the year of incorporation, issued share capital, dividend rate, location of headquarters and 
operations, and the names of directors and commissioners. For more information and the comprised database, 
see: www.colonialbusinessindonesia.nl  
38 J.Th. Lindblad, F. Ochsendorf & M. van de Water, Foreign investment and Dutch colonialism, case studies 
from Indonesia (Leiden 2013), 19-20. 
39 J.Th. Lindblad, Booming business in colonial Indonesia: Corporate strategy and profitability during the 1920s 
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Secondly, to find out whether the profit was reinvested in the company, the local economy, or 
whether profit was paid out to the shareholders in the Netherlands.  
The main source for this research is located in the National Archive in The Hague. The 
archives of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate have been deposited under a separate collection 
in the archive of the N.H.M., under the name Archive of owned plantation companies. This is 
because the N.H.M., in practice, owned the company after 1917. Because of this, there are also 
administrative papers to be found in the main archives of the N.H.M., for example archival 
pieces collected by the secretaries of the N.H.M., the dossier on the archive of the Syndicate 
after it was placed fully under control of the N.H.M. in 1927, and the correspondence between 
Marinus and the N.H.M. 
Not all source material provided in the archive of the Syndicate will be used. The 
correspondence between different commissioners of the company, for instance, often discuss 
topics of little importance. Furthermore, all of the important matters were discussed in the 
meetings between directors, commissioners, and shareholders. So, the main sources that are 
being used are the annual reports of the Syndicate, balance sheets, profit and loss accounts, and 
minutes of the meetings of the directors and the board as well as minutes of the meetings 
between shareholders. However, these sources need to be interpreted with caution, since only 
the information the management wanted to share with the public is given. The information that 
is shared however, can be assumed to be correct. This is due to the fact that the Syndicate’s 
financial reports were double checked by the accountants of the N.H.M. 
For the sake of clarity, statistics of the Syndicate will be displayed in tables and graphs. 
The locations of owned concessions, plantations, and factories will be displayed on maps. On 
these maps and throughout the thesis, traditional names of these concessions, plantations, and 
factories will be used. 
Chapter 1: “A Private National Company” 
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Chapter 1: “A Private National Company” 
The start of private investment 
Before discussing the Dutch East India Land Syndicate in greater detail, it is important to take 
a look at how private companies were able to develop in the Outer Islands of the Archipelago. 
In 1830, the Cultivation System was adopted as a government policy in the Dutch East Indies. 
This policy was created by Governor-General Johannes van den Bosch and implemented on 
Java. It meant that indigenous farmers had to devote 20% of their land to cultivate crops for the 
Dutch government. Local farmers grew indigo, tea, sugar, and coffee. If the value of the crops 
was higher than the market value, the farmers received a small compensation called ‘plantloon’. 
Farmers who did not own suitable land, were forced to work for the government at least 60 days 
a year. This form of vassal service not only stimulated export growth in Java, but also the 
development of an infrastructure of roads and fortifications on the island. The products were 
shipped to the Netherlands and sold on auctions. The shipping and selling was the responsibility 
of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij.43 This system however, was greatly abused by both 
Dutch officials and indigenous rulers. Farmers were forced to devote more land than the 
prescribed 20% or use their most fertile soil for the crops. This resulted in poverty, famine, a 
decline in population, and stronger social differences for the indigenous population.44 
From 1848 onward, criticism on the Cultivation System and corrupt Dutch officials 
grew in the Netherlands. After the Constitutional Reform of 1848, liberal politicians gained the 
upper hand in Dutch politics. These politicians wanted the Cultivation System to be abolished 
as a measure of protection of the indigenous population, and the Dutch East Indies had to be 
opened for private investment. It would, however, take another twenty years before this policy 
came into place. 
The abolition of the Cultivation System came about in 1870, when the Dutch parliament 
adopted two new laws, the so called Suikerwet and Agrarische Wet. The Sugar Law determined 
that the Dutch government would gradually withdraw from the sugar cultivation on Java, ending 
in 1891. Immediate abolition was not possible because the sugar factories still had to be 
supplied with raw materials and the Dutch government still needed the income. This law opened 
up the sugar cultivation on Java for private European companies. The second law, the Agrarian 
Law, is closely related with the Sugar Law. Also implemented in 1870, it ensured that the 
 
43 de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, 47; W.M.F. Mansvelt, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel 
Maatschappij 1824-1924, deel twee (Haarlem 1924), 80-88. 
44 W. van der Doel, Zo ver de wereld strekt. De geschiedenis van Nederland over zee vanaf 1800 (Amsterdam 
2011), 76-80. 
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property rights over the land was recorded. All uncultivated land could be leased to private 
investors for a maximum of 75 years, while at the same time it was possible for the Javanese 
population to rent out their property to Europeans under supervision of the Dutch colonial 
government. So, these two laws made it possible on the one hand for European investors to start 
companies on the island of Java and, on the other hand, the local population was protected 
against large companies because their property right over the land could not be alienated.45  
Although these two laws were mainly applicable to Java, it also opened up the Outer 
Islands of the Archipelago for European private investors. Sumatra and Borneo in particular 
“turned out to be a true Eldorado for pioneers”.46 In the period between 1870 and 1905, which 
Lindblad dubs the prelude of economic expansion in the Outer Islands, some of the biggest 
private companies were founded, such as the Deli Company (Deli-Maatschappij, 1869), the 
Royal Packet Navigation Company (Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, 1888), and the 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Koninklijke Nederlandse Petroleum Maatschappij, 1890). 
Furthermore, in this period the N.H.M. reopened factories outside Java that had been deemed 
unsuccessful before.47 As mentioned before, N.H.M. and K.N.M.E.P. directors stood at 
prominent founders of the Syndicate. 
 
The Netherlands Trading Society48 
As mentioned, it was the N.H.M. which organize the shipping and selling of the Dutch 
government commodities under the Cultivation System. This was the main source of income 
for the N.H.M. up until the system was abolished in 1870. The board of the N.H.M. agreed that 
a change of course was necessary. The Society was already familiar with providing loans to the 
State and other companies in the Dutch East Indies and Japan, and so it was a logical step to 
expand these activities. Due to an amendment in the articles of association of 1874, the N.H.M. 
was allowed to trade in bills and securities.49 
In the beginning, the N.H.M.’s financial activities (issuing of shares, deposits and credit) 
was mostly centred in the Netherlands, but this changed in 1883. The board of the Factory, the 
post of the N.H.M. in Batavia, stated that they “are striving to set up promising operations as 
 
45 van der Doel, Zo ver de wereld strekt, 87-88. 
46 J.Th. Lindblad, ‘Ondernemen in Nederlands-Indië c. 1900-1940’ in: BMGN- Low Countries Historical 
Review, vol.108, no.4 (1993), 699-710, there 703. 
47 Lindblad, De opkomst van de Buitengewesten, 2-7. 
48 To describe the N.H.M. in greater detail would deviate too far from the intent of this paper, so only the part 
related to emissions and syndicates will be treated. For a more detailed account , see: T.de Graaf, Voor Handel 
en Maatschappij, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, 1824-1964 (Amsterdam 2012). 
49 de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, 78-79. 
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bankers, we have endeavoured to participate in the creation of industrial enterprises, the 
construction and exploitation of railways, and the development and exploitation of mines and 
plantations.”50  
The issue of shares can take two different forms. The first is a so- called ‘guichet’. The 
bank acts as a ‘registration desk’ for the subscription of issues for a remuneration. The risk of 
this issue of shares lies with the company that issued them. The shares which have not been 
sold, must be taken back by the company. The second option is an ‘adopted’ issue of shares. 
The bank takes over the total issue of shares at a price lower than the rate of subscription. The 
bank acts as an issuer, selling the shares at a higher rate. The difference between these two rates 
is the provision for the bank. Here, the risk of the issue of shares lies with bank. The company 
knows exactly the total price of the issuing, because the shares that remain unsold stay with the 
bank. The larger the issue of shares, the higher the risk for the bank. Therefore, in order to 
spread the risk, large emissions often take place through a group of banks that form a syndicate. 
Within this syndicate, one of the banks acts as a leader. 
The board of the N.H.M. divided the syndicates they participated in, in three different 
groups: syndicates as a result of different banks working together, syndicates to facilitate 
production and trade, and syndicates which had a national goal. At first, the N.H.M. took part 
in smaller participations without risk, but soon it would partake in riskier emissions for private 
companies. Furthermore, the N.H.M. did not take the initiative for a syndicate, but was asked 
to participate by a friendly bank, such as Hope & Co. or Banque de Paris et des Pays Bas. If the 
N.H.M. received a request to participate, it almost always agreed. The main reason behind this 
was to gain familiarity on emissions, as well as to expand its network to other banks and 
companies.51  
After the turn of the century, the banking activities of the N.H.M. started to grow. The 
agency in Rotterdam became the first agency that was actively involved in banking in 1903. 
The in 1910 newly opened agency in The Hague, was solely used as a registration desk for the 
underwriting of issues. In April 1912, a new Securities Department was opened.52 By 1913, the 
share of equity capital invested in securities and participations totalled to almost 63%, as 
opposed to 47% in 1900. This was mainly due to larger participations in shipping and the 
development of plantations owned by the N.H.M.53 
 
50de Graaf, op. cit., 89 
51 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 435, 1907; de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, 90.  
52 de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, 144-146. 
53 de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, 148. 
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Rather interestingly, Tom de Graaf noted that the N.H.M. did not participate in the 
syndicate on the issue of shares of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company in 1890. De board of 
the N.H.M. did not have many expectations for this new company.54  
 
The Royal Dutch/Shell Group and the Rothschilds 
Next to the N.H.M., directors of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group were also founders of the 
Syndicate in 1910. Roughly a year later, the Rothschilds became the largest foreign shareholder 
in the company. It was Henri Deterding, director of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, who was able 
to convince the Rothschilds to invest in 1911. They had been working together, and were both 
active in the oil industry. The Rothschilds had been active in the oil industry since the 1860s, 
importing petrol from America. In 1877 they also invested in the manufacturing of kerosene in 
Spain.55 From then on, the banking family was also interested in the oil fields in Russian 
Azerbaijan, and in 1883, they bought the Batum Oil Refining and Trading Company (Bnito).56  
It was Fred Lane who was responsible for the shipping of the Batum oil to ports in the 
Mediterranean and Great Britain. After 1885, Lane started exploring the idea to ship the Batum 
oil to the Asian markets. It turned out to be easy to sell the oil there, but the problem was the 
scale. To export the oil to Asia, large tankers were needed, and both the Rothschilds and Lane 
were not willing to make that investment for Bnito. So Lane turned to M. Samuel & Co, a 
shipping company founded in 1878. He proposed to Marcus and Samuel Samuel to start with 
the shipping of kerosene to South East Asia. They accepted, and in December 1891 a supply 
agreement was set up in the form of a syndicate between Lane, Samuel & Co. and the 
Rothschilds. Samuel & Co. became the selling agent for the shipping of Bnito oil to the region 
to the east of the Suez Canal.57 Within a few years, the competition had grown in the Asian 
market with new contenders joining the market. The brothers Samuel needed money, and 
therefore, in 1897, the syndicate was changed into the Shell Transport & Trading Company 
Ltd. The brother Samuel kept the largest share in the company, with the Rothschilds filling up 
the rest.58 
 
54 de Graaf, Voor Handel en Maatschappij, 92. 
55 N. Ferguson, The House of Rothschild, volume 2: The World’s Banker: 1849-1999 (London 2000), 354.  
56 Ferguson, House of Rothschild, vol.2, 355. 
57 J. Jonker & J. Luiten van Zanden, ‘Searching for oil in Roubaix’ in: The Rothschild Archive Annual Review of 
the year: April 2006-March 2007, 21-25, there 21; Ferguson, House of Rothschild, vol.2, 356; J. Jonker & J. 
Luiten van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer tot marktleider, 1890- 1939; Geschiedenis van de Koninklijke Shell, deel 1 
(Amsterdam 2007), 36-40. 
58 Jonker & Luiten van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer tot marktleider, 45-46; Jonker & Luiten van Zanden, Searching 
for oil in Roubaix, 21. 
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Meanwhile, in 1890, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company was founded by H.W.A. 
Deterding, H. Loudon and J.B.A. Kessler. The company started producing oil on Sumatra in 
1892. By 1900, it had become one of the biggest oil producing and selling companies in Asia 
together with Shell Transport. In November 1901, Lane, as director of Shell Transport, and 
Deterding started drafting a plan for a joint venture between Royal Dutch, Shell Transport, and 
Bnito. The Rothschilds willingly accepted to join in this merger, and by May 1902, the plan 
was formalized. The newly founded Asiatic Petroleum Company was founded on an equal 
bases, with each party owning 33% of the shares.59 
Large expansion and bad financial management left Shell Transport nearly bankrupt by 
1905. The brothers Samuel had no option than to look for a merger with the Royal Dutch.60 
After long and difficult talks, the formation of this merger was completed in 1907.61 The 
structure of this new Group was complicated. The two holdings, the Royal Dutch and Shell 
Transport, owned three companies. Two of these were newly founded; the Batavian Oil 
Company in The Hague (Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij B.P.M.), responsible for the 
exploration, manufacturing, and production; and the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company in 
London, responsible for shipping and storage. Both of these companies were owned by the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group in a 60%-40% proportion. The third company was the already 
existing Asiatic, owned for 33% by the Rothschilds, and responsible for the marketing.62 
The Rothschilds kept this percentage until 1911, when they decided to sell Bnito to the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group. This sale left the Rothschilds as the largest shareholders in the Royal 
Dutch. The purchase of companies with shares was seen as an easy way of payment by the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group, given the high stock prices for shares on the stock exchanges in 
London and Amsterdam.63 As a result, the Royal Dutch/Shell Group saw the Rothschilds as 
their most important business partner, not only because they were the largest shareholders, but 
also because they had been partners since the founding of Bnito. The Rothschilds were the only 
partners that received ‘special treatment’. They received confidential updates on the Group’s 
trading and profits, were allowed to send representatives to board meetings, and were given 
suggestions for interesting investments.64 The Syndicate was one of those investments.  
 
59 Jonker & Luiten van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer tot marktleider, 69-70. 
60 Jonker & Luiten van Zanden, Searching for oil in Roubaix, 23. 
61 As with the N.H.M., discussing the details of these discussion would deviate to far from the purpose of this 
paper. For a more detailed account see: Jonker & Luiten van Zanden, Van nieuwkomer tot marktleider,73-83. 
62 Ibidem, 84, 90. 
63 Ibidem, 140. 
64 Jonker & Luiten van Zanden, Searching for oil in Roubaix, 24-25. 
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The establishment of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate 
Johannes Marinus came up with the plan for the establishment of a Dutch company for the 
cultivation of land on a large scale in all parts of the Archipelago a few years after his 
repatriation from the Dutch East Indies. Marinus had already been working several years as a 
planter for the Deli Railway Company and had earned his money by investing in the tobacco 
industry on Sumatra. When Maurinus worked for the Deli Company (Deli Maatschappij), he 
was tasked with the search for suitable lands for the cultivation of tobacco. It was during this 
time that Marinus met Hendrikus Colijn, who was then still serving as an officer for the Dutch 
military, met. Because of the ongoing hostilities in Aceh between Dutch colonial forces and 
local indigenous rebels as a result of the Aceh War, planters had to be protected by the Dutch 
army.65 It was Colijn who was responsible for the protection of the Deli Company planters 
active in Aceh.66 
Marinus contacted Colijn in 1909 and told him of his plans. Taking the Deli Company 
as an example, he explained that he wanted to create a company of at least 100.000.67 But 
together, Marinus and Colijn decided that they wanted more, and worked up a plan for a 
company with a “dual purpose”. In his rapport Marinus stated: “The Government cannot but 
welcome the fact that a powerful Dutch Company is doing 
the job, which can be expected from the Dutch in the first place, namely the further development 
and cultivation of our possessions” and “agricultural development bring permanent prosperity 
to the population and promotes the trading and shipping of the motherland.”68 
To attract investors, Colijn drew up a letter in which he explained the advantages of 
such enterprise. The Dutch East India Land Syndicate Ltd. had to become a company with a 
“dual motive”. On the one hand, it had to become a company “with which one hopes to make 
money” and, on the other hand, it had “to strengthen the Dutch East Indies and at the same time 
increase the interest of the Fatherland for the Dutch East Indies.”69 He sent this letter to the 
 
65 van ’t Veer, de Atjeh-oorlog, 249, 291; Kreemer, Atjeh dl1, 41-43. 
66 P.E. Werkman & R.E. van der Woude, “Hendrikus Colijn (1896-1944) Soldaat, zakenman, politicus”, in: P.E. 
Werkman & R.E. van der Woude, Geloof in eigen zaak: Markante protestantse werkgevers in de negentiende en 
twintigste eeuw (Hilversum 2006), 191-234, there 202. 
67 H. Buiter & A. Doedens, Nederlands-Indië (1830-1949): een kolonie in ontwikkeling, (Utrecht 1993), 80-82. 
68 “de Regeering kan niet anders dan toejuichen dat eene krachtige Nederlandsche Maatschappy het werk doet, 
dat toch in de eerste plaats van Nederlanders verwacht kan worden, namelijk het verder ontginnen en in cultuur 
brengen onzer bezittingen” and “Landbouw brengt blyvende welvaart aan de bevolking en bevordert handel en 
scheepvaart van het moederland” in: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11725, 05-02-1911. 
69 “waarmee men geld hoopt te verdienen” and “Indië versterken en tegelijkertijd de belangstelling van het 
Vaderland voor Indië te verhoogen.” in: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11750, correspondence with A.J. Cohen 
Stuart 1910-1917, there January 1910; NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11752, correspondence with H.W.A. 
Deterding 1910-1917, there January 1910; NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11757, correspondence with jhr. H. 
Loudon 1910-1924, there January 1910. 
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directors of the Royal Dutch Shell, H.W.A. Deterding, A.J. Cohen Stuart, and H. Loudon. These 
men al reacted positively and wanted the Royal Dutch Shell to invest in the new company. 
After attracting investors successfully, Colijn needed the cooperation of the Dutch 
minister of Colonies and the government of the Dutch East India. This was mainly due to the 
fact that a new ordonnance for leasehold was approved an applied in 1909.70 Article 3 of this 
ordonnance states that a plot of land which is to be given as a concession cannot exceed 3.500 
hectares (= 5.000 bouws).71 Werkman and van der Woude argue that this was to prevent 
monopolistic exploitation. Next to that, they argue that the Dutch East Indies government 
wanted a share in the exploitation of these concessions. However, this is not included in the 
ordonnance. Instead, the ordonnance states in article 2 that measures were necessary so that the 
issuance of concessions could proceed in an orderly fashion.72 
Next to article 2 and 3 of the ordonnance there was still a later introduction of the 
bebouwingsclausule, or ‘building clause’. This clause provided the Dutch East India 
Government with the chance of denying an application for a concession is there was not enough 
capital available to cover the take-off costs of cultivation. Article 14 of the ordonnance includes 
the mapping of the plot, the marking of its boundaries, and the remuneration of the indigenous 
population.73 Furthermore, this clause also adopted a rule from British India, according to which 
within a certain amount of years, a specific part of a concession had to be cultivated. This 
prevented speculation on plots of land by people who sought to sell the land with profit on the 
short or long run, without cultivating a single hectare. The ordonnance stipulated that within 
three years, ten percent of the land had to be cultivated. After six years this had to increase to 
twenty percent, and after nine years at least one third had to be cultivated.74 
If the Syndicate was to quickly gain concessions in the Archipelago, it needed an 
exemption to the ordonnance and the building clause. To achieve this, the Minister of Colonies 
and the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies had to be convinced. Colijn thought that he 
would be able to use his colonial connections to get this exemption. Johannes van Heutsz, 
Colijn’s mentor during his military career, had already given some companies larger plots of 
 
70 J.G.W. Lekkerkerker, Concessies en erfpachten ten behoeve van landbouwondernemingen in de 
Buitengewesten van Nederlands-Indië (The Hague 1928), appendix II, 189-211. 
71 A bouw is a Dutch length which was commonly used for the definition of land throughout the Archipelago. 
Although differing from place to place, the common size was 1 bouw equals 0,715 hectare; Lekkerkerker, 
Concessies en erfpachten, appendix II, 190. 
72 Ibidem, 39 and 189. 
73 Ibidem, 194. 
74 Ibidem, 45-46; P.M. Letterie & W.R. de Keizer, Agrarische en daarmede verband houdende regelingen voor 
het rechtstreeks bestuurd gebied der gewesten buiten Java en Madoera (Weltevreden 1924), 328-339. 
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land during his time as Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies.75 Furthermore, Colijn had 
become a member of the Dutch parliament in 1909 for the Anti Revolutionary Party (Anti 
Revolutionaire Partij, A.R.P.). Before that, he had already become friends with A.W.F. 
Idenburg and J.H. de Waal Malefijt, who were now members of the same political party.76 
Idenburg was appointed as Minister of Colonies for the second time in 1908, but accepted the 
function as Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies in 1909, thereby becoming the successor 
of Van Heutsz. De Waal Malefijt then took over Idenburg’s position as Minister of Colonies in 
1909. 
Colijn and Marinus visited de Waal Malefijt on the 20th of May 1910. After hearing 
about the idea of the company, de Waal Malefijt was quickly convinced and promised both men 
that they would receive ‘maximum cooperation’ from the Ministry of Colonies. The Minister 
also told Colijn and Marinus to not forget about the N.H.M. He argued that the director of the 
company, C.J.K. van Aalst, would be interested in the plan as well. Colijn decided to send him 
the rapport he had written for the directors of the Royal Dutch Shell. It did not take long before 
they received a positive answer from van Aalst.77 
On the 9th of June 1910, Marinus had arranged a meeting in the head office of the 
Batavian Oil Company (Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij, B.P.M.). He invited five men: 
director of the N.H.M., C.J.K. van Aalst, directors of the Royal Dutch Shell, H.W.A. Deterding 
and A.J. Cohen Stuart, and business partner Hendrikus Colijn. During this meeting, it was 
decided that the Dutch East India Land Syndicate Ltd. was to be established. All men present, 
as well as jhr. H. Loudon, agreed to buy five shares worth ƒ10.000,-, to raise a starting capital. 
Furthermore, it was decided that Colijn and Marinus would become the directors of the new 
company, while the other men would become commissioners. The founding memorandum and 
articles of association were officially signed on the 5th of August 1910.78 
 
An enlargement of stock capital and the search for new shareholders 
Even before the Syndicate was established in August 1910, it had already received a setback. 
In July 1910, Colijn received the news that the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indië), the main 
advisory body of the Governor-General, rejected the plan to give the company exemption from 
the leasehold ordonnance and its building clause. Normally, the Governor-General and the 
 
75 Werkman & van der Woude, Hendrikus Colijn, 203. 
76 C. Bremmer, ARP, Personen en momenten uit de geschiedenis van de Anti Revolutionaire Partij (Franeker 
1980), 112. 
77 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11747, correspondence with C.J.K. van Aalst 1910-1922, May 1910. 
78 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11725, 5 August 1910. 
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Minister of Colonies would follow the advice of the Council, but Colijn wanted to know the ins 
and outs of the matter. Colijn wrote to Marinus that “for now the idea has to be shelved”, but 
promised to find out where it went wrong.79 Meanwhile, the process for the application of 
concession went on, which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. 
Colijn received the news regarding the exemption in November 1910 from its 
representative in the East Indies, H.J. Stoof. He, in his turn, had received a letter from the 
director of the Department of Internal Governance for the Dutch East Indies, D. Tollenaar.80 In 
his letter he stated that the colonials officials, who were responsible for the issuance of 
concessions, had become sceptical because they thought that the starting capital of ƒ1.000.000,- 
of which only ƒ300.000,- was issued, was too low to pay for the successful exploitation of such 
a vast amount of uncultivated land.81 To sort out this problem as soon as possible, Colijn sent a 
telegram to Tollenaar stating: “Initial capital Syndicate only meant for the purpose of 
exploration – enlargement of capital after the issuance of land is ensured – send notice to 
Governor-General as soon as possible – letter will follow quickly.”82 He immediately drew up 
a letter to explain the situation, and on the same day he sent this to the Minister of Colonies, the 
Governor-General, and to Tollenaar.83  
On the 5th of January 1911, a response from Idenburg came in. In a letter addressed to 
Colijn, he explained that he shared the opinion of the colonial officials in the Archipelago. 
Furthermore, he stated that he did not agree with the special treatment that the Syndicate 
wanted. He thought that this exemption translated onto preferential treatment and that it 
eventually would lead to a wave of speculations on concessions in the Archipelago.84 For that 
reason, the Syndicate would not receive the exemption, and concessions had to be received via 
the ‘conventional’ route. 
The second board meeting of the directors and the commissioners of the Syndicate, 
turned out to be quite disputed. Colijn accepted the invitation to become the next Minister of 
 
79 “[…] voor het oogenblik is het denkbeeld zeer beslist van de baan” in: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11745, 15 
July 1910. 
80 The Governor-General governed the Dutch East Indies. The Archipelago was divided into provinces 
(gewesten), which were governed by Residents. In turn, these provinces consisted of three to five different 
‘departments’(afdelingen), which were governed by Assistant-Residents. All of these government officials were 
part of the ‘Department of Internal Governance’ (Departement van Binnenlands Bestuur). At the head of this 
department is the Director. For a more detailed account see: H.W. van den Doel, De stille macht: het Europese 
binnenlands bestuur op Java en Madoera, 1808-1942 (Amsterdam 1994). 
81 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11735, 23 December 1910. 
82 “Aanvankelijk kapitaal Syndicaat alleen berekend voor exploratie doeleinden, groote uitbreiding kapitaal voor 
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War and had to leave his function as director for the Syndicate.85 As a replacement, 
commissioner Loudon invited J.B. van Heutsz, former governor-general of the Indies, to 
become president-commissioner. Van Heutsz, Loudon and Colijn became then the Executive 
Committee of the Syndicate. Van Heutsz was tasked with the organization of meetings, Loudon 
with the search for new shareholders, and Colijn would give advice when necessary.86 
The most important point on the agenda was the proposal to enlarge the stock capital of 
the Syndicate. For this to happen, the statutes had to be amended. After a long discussion, the 
Board decided to raise the capital to ƒ4.000.000,-. However, the majority of these shares were 
to be owned by Dutch companies or private investors. It was just a small majority, because 
ƒ1.800.000,- had to come from foreign investors, while ƒ2.200.000,- had to come from Dutch 
investors. This was divided into ƒ350.000,- from the management and commissioners, 
ƒ1.000.000,- from the N.H.M., and ƒ850.000,- from new Dutch shareholders. Furthermore, the 
Board decided that 350 profit participation certificates would be created, which gave the right 
to 20% of yearly excess profits. The excess profit was only paid off after shareholders received 
dividend over their original investment. The interest rate was set at 6%, which was the average 
shareholders normally would expect on investment.87 Deterding would take care of finding 
foreign investors, using his network from the Royal Dutch Shell.88 
By May 1911, the Syndicate had found new investors and the commissioners discussed 
the new articles of incorporation that had to be drawn up. The stock capital of ƒ4.000.000,- was 
now divided into 90 issued shares A, worth ƒ5.000,- each, and 3.550 shares B worth ƒ1.000,- 
each. The commissioners of the Syndicate, now including J.B. van Heutsz, bought 10 shares. 
Colijn had managed to convince president-director of the N.H.M., J.T. Cremer, to buy 10 shares 
A as well as 1.000 shares B. Meanwhile, Deterding had also struck gold, convincing the de 
Rothschild banking family of France ( Fa. de Rothschild Frêres) to invest by buying 10 shares 
A and 1.850 shares B. Other smaller Dutch investors followed, including banks and private 
investors, such as J.T. Cremer, the Twentsche Bankvereeniging, and Van Lissa & Kann Private 
Bankers. Only 250 shares B were left unissued.89 
There were, however, more points for discussion regarding the amendment of the 
articles of association, and it would take half a year before an agreement was reached. The 
Rothschilds filed a complaint that the extra allowance for the commissioners and directors was 
 
85 Werkman & van der Woude, Hendrikus Colijn, 205. 
86 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11735, 30 January 1911. 
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too high. Their representative stated that: “this would lead to negligence and bad financial 
management.”90 The second complaint came from the N.H.M. in August 1911. Van Aalst, as 
representative for the N.H.M., stated that the ratio between shares A and shares B was unfair. 
The N.H.M. had the largest investment in the Syndicate, but only the shareholders A were able 
to buy the profit participation certificates. Deterding replied that the commissioners did all the 
work and thus had the right to profit from this. As a compensation, van Aalst proposed to give 
the N.H.M. a consignment contract to sell the goods the Syndicate produced, and thereby 
keeping a share of the profit. Furthermore, the Syndicate would promise to do all its bank affairs 
via the N.H.M. The one resolving both issues was August Philips, director of the Royal Dutch, 
who was invited to partake in the meeting by Van Heutsz. He stated that he had been present 
from the start and had seen the company grow. Regarding the complaint filed by the 
Rothschilds, he agreed and stated that this was not “the purpose of the Syndicate, since no profit 
had been made yet.” Regarding the second point, he noted that, even if the directors of the 
N.H.M. had not seen the new statutes, van Aalst could have already communicated with the 
other directors. As a result, the complaint regarding the ratio was filed too late. Van Aalst was 
not able to respond to this, and so both issues were resolved.91 
On the 4th of December 1911, the articles of incorporation were finally amended. The 
stock capital however, was raised to ƒ10.000.000,-. Reading the articles of association, article 
4 states that this could only be done via a unanimous decision in a shareholder meeting. The 
archive of the Syndicate does not provide the minutes of this particular meeting. Still, the yearly 
balance sheet does provide a total of stock capital of ƒ10.000.000,- of which ƒ6.000.000,- is not 
yet placed.92 Again, there were 90 shares A, worth ƒ5000,- each, which were all issued. The 
amount of shares B was raised to 9.550, worth ƒ1.000,- each, of which 3.550 were issued.93 
Meanwhile, Deterding had managed to persuade other foreign banks, related to the de 
Rothschild family bank of France, to participate in the Syndicate. The French bank had decided 
to sell 250 of its shares B to the N.M. Rothschild & Sons in London and 250 shares B to the 
Les Fils de A. Deutsch in Paris. Representatives of the banks also bought shares from the French 
bank. F. Lane and L.A. Auerbach, representatives for the English and French banks, each 
bought 10 shares B, while the new Belgian representative, Baron Léon Lambert, bought 12 
shares B. The N.H.M. sold 10 of its shares B to S.C. van Musschenbroek, former superintendent 
for the Syndicate in Sumatra. The last 250 shares B were now issued as well between various 
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Dutch private investors. Marinus had the largest share in this issue, with an investment of 
ƒ187.000,-.94 Furthermore, the amount of commissioners in the Board was raised from five to 
eight, of which a majority had to be Dutch.95 The newly created places were taken by Lane, 
Auerbach, and van Musschenbroek.96 
As mentioned, there is no explanation provided nor are there any minutes to be found 
as to why the stock capital was raised to ƒ10.000.000,-. Furthermore, of the ƒ6.000.000,- that 
was left unissued, only ƒ750.000,- was placed by the N.H.M. in 1917, which will be discussed 
in greater detail later in this thesis. Still, a possible explanation can be given, and this is related 
to the problems the Syndicate had with the acquisition of concessions in the Archipelago. By 
showing that they had multiplied their stock capital tenfold within less than a year, the Syndicate 
wanted to let colonials officials know that they meant business.  
 
Van Aalst takes over 
By the beginning of 1912 the differences between commissioners and shareholders had been 
settled and the Syndicate was finally able to start growing. Over the next few years the company 
received its first concessions, bought its first plantations, and started developing. How this 
happened will be discussed in chapter 2. By the end of 1916, the Syndicate owned four 
plantations and a little over a dozen concessions in three different regencies. The plantations 
produced tea, rubber and coffee, and the profits were reinvested in the company (figure 1). The 
estimated value of these plantations and concessions were a little over ƒ4.000.000,- (figure 2). 
However, as a result of the First World War, profits were low, and according to some 
commissioners, development was not going fast enough. According to Loudon, the original 
plan to cultivate as many concessions as possible, was lost ignored. Instead, the small profits 
made were reinvested in the plantations. During a meeting in May 1916, Loudon proposed to 
sell plantations in order to gather more funds for the cultivation of the grounds. Van Aalst did 
not agree, stating that their only source of income would disappear. Instead, he proposed to 
borrow ƒ1.500.000,- from the N.H.M. and the Rothschilds to speed up the process of 
cultivation. Loudon accepted, but Auerbach stated that it would be hard to convince the 
Rothschilds to invest further in the company.97  
Auerbach was proven to be right half a year later. In October 1916, van Heutsz had 
received an offer from the Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam (H.V.A.). They offered 
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ƒ6.000.000,- for the Syndicate and all its assets. This meant that the shares A were valued at 
160% and the shares B at 128% of the original price. 98 During the next meeting of the Board 
of Commissioners, Van Heutsz, Colijn, Auerbach, Loudon, and Marinus all agreed, while 
Deterding and Lane were not present. The only one who opposed the offer was Van Aalst. He 
stated: “[I] cannot see why we should let this business go, now that it is growing.”99 Auerbach 
reported that the Rothschilds refused further investment in the Syndicate, even if extra capital 
was available after the war. Instead, they wanted to accept the offer of the H.V.A. Van Aalst 
was furious. He answered that the difficulties resulting from the lack of cooperation of the 
Rothschilds and of some commissioners forced him to prefer to accept the offer. However, 
when he heard that other commissioners were in favour of selling, he changed his mind and 
wanted to make it a successful company whatever the cost.100 To allow reflection time, van 
Heutsz suspended the meeting that way to be continued when Marinus retrieved more 
information on the overall situation.  
On the next meeting in January 1917, van Aalst showed up fully prepared. As soon as 
the meeting opened, he started his speech. He reminded the commissioners that the Rothschilds 
were never willing to cooperate and only gave negative criticism, instead of trying to work 
together for a better enterprise. He then repeated his statement from the last meeting that he 
strongly opposed selling the Syndicate, and that they would regret the decision in the years to 
come. Furthermore, van Aalst argued that after the capital would surely be ready available and 
more cooperation should be expected from the Dutch Indian government. Lastly he stated: “The 
Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij has never abandoned a company, not even one who 
experienced heavy financial difficulties.”101 As a result, the offer of the H.V.A. was refused. 
This resulted in another wave of rapid changes within the company. The Rothschilds 
sold all of their shares A and B to the N.H.M. at the exchange rate of 160% and 128% 
respectively. Auerbach, Lane, Deterding and Cohen Stuart all resigned as commissioners, and 
sold their shares to the N.H.M. as well. This meant that not only the Rothschilds, but also two 
out of three directors of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group had left the Syndicate. Also, van Heutsz 
sold his shares A at the exchange rate of 200% to the N.H.M., and bought 100 of new shares B 
instead. 
 
98 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11888. 
99 “Spreker kan overigens niet inzien waarom wij deze zaak, nu ze goed is, moeten laten schieten.” In: NL-
HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11735, 23 December 1916. 
100 Ibidem. 
101 “De Nederlandsche Handel Maatschappij heeft nog nooit eene cultuur maatschappij, ook niet die welke in 
zeer groote finantieele moeilijkheden verkeerden, aan haar lot overgelaten.” In: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 
11736, 6 January 1917. 
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After this shift in ownership, van Aalst argued that it would be wise to appoint a second 
director. He proposed two men, former head administrator of the plantations of the Syndicate 
in Sumatra, M.J. Salm, and N.J. Hoorweg. The one who was not chosen, would then become a 
new commissioner for the Syndicate. Because of his experience in dealing with the plantations 
on Sumatra, Salm was chosen as the second director, meaning that Hoorweg became the 
commissioner. Van Aalst also argued in favour of a second Secretary for the Board, H.A. van 
de Wall Bake.102 His argument was that Marinus, as sole director of the Syndicate, simply could 
not deliver in time. Van Aalst accused him of flooding the meetings of the Board with 
paperwork, leaving out really important documents. Marinus also kept abhorring 
correspondence with the commissioners and he kept spending money everywhere with funds 
that the Syndicate did not have. The second director and a new secretary were the necessary to 
keep Marinus in check.103 
Van Aalst kept implementing changes. Since the N.H.M. had become the largest 
shareholder within the Syndicate, the head office was moved from The Hague to Amsterdam, 
so that it was closely located to the head office of the N.H.M. Vacant positions in the Board 
remained opened and a majority was needed to make decisions. This resulted in a Board of five 
commissioners by 1917. In terms of executive policy, the Board agreed with van Aalst to 
reinvest all profits in the cultivation of the concessions. As a result, the payment of dividends 
to shareholders was paused until the company was able to make a decent profit. This was 
followed by the halting of payment of bonusses to directors and commissioners, a measure 
accepted unanimously by the board.104  
 In November 1917, all these points were formalized in new articles of association. By 
December 1917, the Board of the Syndicate had also agreed to sign an agreement of 
consignment with the N.H.M.105 This was the agreement van Aalst wanted when the stock 
capital was raised in 1911. However, he went a step further this time. He included in this 
agreement the authorization for the Syndicate to apply for a loan from the N.H.M. This reduced 
the need to find new investors. It also included a so called ‘oogstverband’, which meant that 
the N.H.M. would store goods and products produced by the Syndicate if the prices on the world 
market would be too low. The N.H.M. would then sell them when the prices went up again, 
shifting the responsibility of price and market formation onto the hands of the N.H.M.106 
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All in all, the year 1917 was just as ‘eventful’ as 1911 with many discussions held in 
the beginning of the year, and leading to many changes being implemented by the end of the 
year. The big difference between these two bench years, is the end result. By the end of 1911, 
the different shareholders were still working together to develop a stable and healthy company, 
able to cultivate land and build plantations all over the Archipelago. By the end of 1917 
however, there is not much left of a syndicate apart from the name. The directors of the Royal 
Dutch/ Shell Group and the Rothschilds had left the Board of Commissioners. The N.H.M. 
became the largest shareholder, owning 50 out of 90 shares A and 3.615 out of 4.750 shares B.  
Apart from the N.H.M. becoming the largest shareholder within the Syndicate, it seems 
as if van Aalst had become the most powerful man within the company. According to de Graaf, 
this was not the first time. He states that, after van Aalst had become president-director in 1913 
“[he] wás the N.H.M.”.107 However, it is the new division between the Board and the directors 
that possibly gave him this influential position. As mentioned, a majority was needed to 
implement new decisions within the Board. The commissioners agreed that it would be wise to 
appoint two more commissioners so that a majority was easily reached. N.J. Hoorweg became 
official commissioner in 1918,108 while A.W.F. Idenburg was invited by Van Heutsz but he had 
to decline because he had once again become Minister of Colonies. This makes the appointment 
of Nicolaas Johannes Hoorweg rather interesting. Cornelis van Aalst was married to Tjalda 
Hoorweg and they had three children. Their oldest son was called Nicolaas Johannes van Aalst. 
It is difficult to prove that it was his son who joined the Board of Commissioners. However, 
N.J. van Aalst had just finished his PhD dissertation at the University of Utrecht. Being 
appointed to a smaller company, using his mother’s maiden name, would provide him with the 
necessary knowledge, before he started working as an agent for the N.H.M. in 1920.109 This 
may partly explain why van Aalst was able to implement his policies and radically change the 
corporate structure of the Syndicate again a decade later. 
 
A Board of Directors instead of a Supervisory Board 
Just as in 1911, the period after the reformation of the Syndicate in 1917 saw a rapid expansion 
of the company on all grounds. In 1917 alone, a further eight concessions were granted to the 
Syndicate, followed by another four in 1921. Between 1917 and 1920, the Syndicate managed 
to open and develop eleven plantations in three different regencies (map 2a,2b,2c). Next to 
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rubber, tea, and coffee, the company also started producing palm oil. This was expanded with 
cinchona in 1920 (table 1). The total value of its concessions and plantations was estimated at 
a little over ƒ6.250.000,-. This had quadrupled within seven years, with the value estimated at 
ƒ26.000.000,- in 1924 (figure 2). The overall status of the company looked promising, 
especially when 1919 turned out to be the first profitable year (figure 3). However, this turned 
out to be short-lived. 
During a Board meeting on 1 December 1920, the current state of affairs was discussed. 
Second director Salm had just arrived from the Archipelago and joined the discussion. He stated 
that because of the rapid expansion of the plantations and concessions on Sumatra, he could not 
control expenditure. The cost of exploitation in 1920 alone totalled ƒ500.000,-, while the 
company was only able to sell ƒ25.000,- worth of products.110 F.P.J. Vester, who had become 
director of the N.H.M. as well as commissioner for the Syndicate in 1918, added that the total 
loan from the N.H.M. was at that point ƒ15.000.000,-. Marinus argued that, although the costs 
of exploitation were too high, the total value of the plantations and concessions was still 
growing. He continued by adding that the harvest of the products was good, but that world 
market prices were too low. So, there was still a large amount of products stored on the 
plantations, ready to be sold when the prices went up again. Both Salm and van Aalst did not 
agree. Salm resigned as second director, and the Board decided to send Marinus to Sumatra.111 
What followed were two years when Marinus kept sending rapports to the Board in 
which he asked permission to keep expanding the cultivation on the already existing plantations, 
and the Board kept voting against it. Although the total value of the plantations kept rising in 
1921 and 1922, costs for the exploitation were unnecessarily high resulting in heavy financial 
losses for the company (figure 3). Meanwhile, the Syndicate was not able to sell produce, 
remaining with a stock of ƒ1.200.000,- of unsold products by the end of 1922.112  
Within these two years, it seems as if the commissioners lost interest in the company. 
During the first ten years of the Syndicate’s existence, the Board met at least once every three 
months. But from 1921 onwards, they only met once a year in the second week of November. 
The board discussed the annual reports, denied any form of further expansion apart from what 
they had planned back in 1917, and implemented cuts on the salaries of their European 
personnel on Sumatra. In this context, Van Heutsz resigned as commissioner in 1922, leaving 
another vacancy in the Board.113 
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During the meeting in November 1923, the Board voted for change so that the Syndicate 
could finally start making some profit. Vester reminded his fellow Board members of the 
original goal of the Syndicate, which was to receive concessions, cultivate them, and sell the 
plantations to other Dutch companies, so that it would benefit the national cause. However, he 
argued that because of the war this did not work out as expected. He then continued by stating 
that this problem should have been solved by Marinus but instead, Marinus kept investing in 
the already existing plantations, while it was hard for the company to sell its products. Instead, 
he should have paid more attention to the cultivation of concessions, so that these could be sold 
with a profit. The owned plantations were just there to generate some extra income, to be 
reinvested in the cultivation process of the concessions.114 
The Board, and especially van Aalst, agreed with Vester and they drew up a future plan. 
To make sure the company was successful, they first had to consolidate. As a result, the 
Syndicate stopped applying for new concessions until the ones in portfolio were ready to be 
sold or to be turned into plantations. Furthermore, Marinus was ordered to stop the expansion 
of the already owned plantations, and instead was instructed to find possible buyers for the 
plantations. Furthermore, a selection of concessions was needed, classifying the stock between 
‘suitable’ and ‘not suitable’ for cultivation. The latter were returned to the Government of the 
Indies. The stockpiled products had to be sold.115  
These plans turned out to be successful. The plantations did not expand further (figure 
1, table 1), losses were minimized, and Marinus had set up the first negotiations with other 
companies for the selling of concessions and plantations. Meanwhile, the Syndicate faced 
another problem. Colijn had to resign as commissioner in 1923, because he had become the 
Minister of Finance. Because Colijn left, Loudon laid down his position as commissioner in 
1924. The Board consisted solely of representatives from the N.H.M. These were director van 
Aalst, director Vester, and agent Hoorweg.116 This gave van Aalst the opportunity to kill two 
birds with one stone. He planned to change the current structure of a Director, a Supervisory 
Board, and a representative in Batavia, to a new Board of Directors. This new Board would 
solely encompass directors and other personnel from the N.H.M. together with Marinus. The 
position of Director would disappear, along with the head administrators on Sumatra. On the 
one hand, this would mean that Marinus was not able to take action by himself, but was always 
under control of the N.H.M. On the other hand, instead of having its own agent in Batavia, the 
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new representative was to come from the N.H.M. factory in Medan. The representative reported 
than to the Syndicate and the N.H.M. simultaneously.117 
However, van Aalst faced one problem. He was not able to change the articles of 
association with just three men in the Board. According to the articles of 1917, at least five 
commissioners had to cast a vote, with a majority voting in favour, to change these articles. So, 
during the meeting in Augustus 1926, he proposed to appoint two new commissioners. The first 
was Ph.J. Priesman, secretary for the Syndicate and the N.H.M., and the second was N.R. Boon, 
accountant for the Syndicate and the N.H.M. Both Vester and Hoorweg agreed. On the same 
day, a vote was cast, and the concept version of the articles was adopted unanimously by the 
five commissioners.118 Just three days later, the new Board of Directors was formalized by the 
notary in the new articles of association.119 Meanwhile, Marinus was still busy with negotiating 
the sale of concessions and plantations, and he did not have a clue of what had happened. He 
only received a telegram that he was allowed to sell certain concessions and plantations.120 
The members of the Board of Directors were appointed on the 1st of March 1927. From 
the old Supervisory Board came van Aalst and Hoorweg, along with former director Marinus. 
They were joined by J. Bierens de Haan, director of the N.H.M. since 1918; J.C.A. Everwijn, 
director of the N.H.M. since 1922; and D. Crena de Iongh, director of the N.H.M. since 1925. 
Next to commissioner, Hoorweg was also appointed secretary and received a monthly salary of 
ƒ12.000,-. Van Aalst was appointed as chairman while Bierens de Haan became his deputy. 
Van Aalst, Bierens de Haan and Marinus remained executive managers. As compensation, 
Marinus would receive ƒ10.000,- as a salary, thus earning less than secretary Hoorweg. 121 The 
delegate for the Syndicate in the Archipelago was at the head office of the N.H.M. in Batavia 
(Factory).122 
 
The Syndicate as a subsidiary company 
The new Board of Directors translated onto a new status for Syndicate as it became a subsidiary 
company of the N.H.M. This new status had consequences. First, all new European personnel 
that was hired, as well as all members of the Board, came from the N.H.M. As a result, the 
Syndicate was now represented by an agent from the N.H.M. agency in Medan, M.J. 
 
117 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11726, Articles of Association Concept 1926, art 12 and 16. 
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Herbschleb. Furthermore, the Board named J.C. Groenenberg as the Syndicate’s inspector. He 
had already been working as inspector on several plantations owned by the N.H.M. Second, the 
Syndicate was now being developed in the same way the other companies were developed by 
the N.H.M. Lastly, the Board was to meet more frequently.123 
From 1927 onwards, the Syndicate did not expand much. Acquisition of new plantations 
stopped and concessions were sold or given back to the government. The only exception to this 
was the planted hectares of tea and palm oil on the already owned plantations (table 1,5,6). This 
did lead to another profitable year in 1929, when close to ƒ900.000,- profit was made. After 
that, the crisis hit the world market. The Syndicate was unable to sell its products, international 
restrictions on tea and cinchona were implemented to protect prices, and the European 
personnel in the Archipelago had to withstand continuous wage reductions before being fired. 
The Board stopped further expansion of the planted hectares on the plantations (figure1). Next 
to that, the value of these plantations slowly declined throughout the years (figure 2). The 
amount of yearly losses was minimized, but still totalled nearly ƒ20.000.000,-. The only 
profitable year was 1936, when the Syndicate received a rectification worth ƒ3.300.000,- for 
paying too much taxes (figure 3). 
In 1938, the N.H.M. was appointed director of the Syndicate. The head office of the 
Syndicate was sold, and from then on the day-to-day operations were conducted from the head 
office of the N.H.M. in Amsterdam.124 The annual reports were since then simply added to the 
annual reports of the N.H.M. 
 
Conclusion 
When the Syndicate was founded, everything looked promising for Marinus and Colijn. Via 
their own network they had found investors and companies that were interested in the idealistic 
set up of the company. The Minister of Colonies and Governor-General had promised to 
provide the Syndicate with institutional cooperation and even protection. Because of the shared 
effort of different groups, the Syndicate would be able to cultivate large plots of land in every 
corner of the Archipelago, turn these in to plantations, and bear the fruits of its. 
However, roughly five years later, the Syndicate had not made much progress. By the 
end of 1916, the idea of “a powerful Dutch company” that cultivated and exploited large plots 
of Dutch possessions, seemed to be lost. By the end of 1917, a lot had changed within the head 
office of the Syndicate. One the one hand, the primary exploitative and national goal was central 
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again. The company would again focus on the cultivation of concessions rather than investing 
in its plantations. On the other hand, the principle of a ‘shared effort’ seemed to have 
disappeared. Not only did the N.H.M. own the majority of shares, it also had a majority within 
the Board. This is even more so in 1927. Cleverly van Aalst made sure that the Syndicate was 
fully under the control of the N.H.M by the end of 1926. In this sense, the idea of a ‘syndicate’ 
only applies to the first six to seven years of the company’s existence. After that it was nothing 
more than the name of the company. The other shareholders and commissioners slowly started 
to leave, being Marinus the only N.H.M. outsider until he passed away in 1930. 
When comparing the Dutch East India Land Syndicate to other syndicates in the 
Archipelago, it becomes clear that hardly any financial syndicates existed. The syndicates that 
were common on the Archipelago were business organisations, formed by owners of plantations 
in a specific sector. The establishment of such organizations was usually a response to a 
situation in which economic or cultural interests of a sector were threatened. Examples of this 
are the General Syndicate of Sugar Manufactures in the Dutch East Indies (Algemeen Syndicaat 
van Suikerfabrikanten in Nederlands-Indië), established after the sugar crisis of 1884, and the 
Dutch East India Agriculture Syndicate (Nederlandsch Indisch Landbouw Syndicaat).125 This 
did not mean however, that the Syndicate was not able to fulfil its original goal. The next chapter 
will analyse how the business proceeded in the Archipelago. 
 
125 Th.G.E. Hoedt, Indische bergcultuurondernemingen, voornamelijk in Zuid-Sumatra (Wageningen 1930), 29-
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Chapter 2: The activities of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate 
This chapter analyses in detail the three main branches the company focussed on. These can 
also be found in the main goal of the Syndicate. These three branches are: 1. the creation, 
exploitation and management of plantations, 2. obtaining and selling land concessions, and 3. 
the financial participation in other companies that envisaged the same goal. But before these 
branches can be assessed, a small description is given on the start of the Syndicate in the Dutch 
East Indies. 
 
An enthusiastic start 
Immediately after the company was founded, the founders decided that it was necessary to send 
a representative to the Dutch East Indies. This representative was tasked with inspecting and 
requesting suitable concessions in the Archipelago.126 Marinus and Colijn found the suitable 
person in a former colleague of Marinus, H.J. Stoof. He had worked for the Deli Railway 
Company and as supervisor on Marinus’s plantations.127 Stoof arrived Batavia in August and 
was able to submit the first requests for concessions in December 1910.128 The list is extensive 
and includes concessions throughout different areas in the Archipelago (map 1)129: 
• 55.000 hectares in the residency of Lampung 
• 285.000 hectares in the residency of Palembang 
• 50.000 hectares in the residency of Banjuwangi 
• 60.000 hectares in the residency of Bencoolen 
• 50.000 hectares in the residency of Tapanuli 
• ¾ of the island of Enggano 
• 17.500 hectares on the Westcoast of Sumatra 
 
These grounds were deemed suitable for the cultivation of cotton, coconuts, coffee, 
rubber, tea, tobacco, palm oil and copra. Because of the large amount of acreage and the 
diversity of products, the directors of the Syndicate decided to hire K.L.F.A. Thörig, former 
employee of the Dutch East India Ordnance Survey. He left for Sumatra in December 1910 and 
he was tasked with the registry of the plots that Stoof had requested.130 Furthermore, Marinus 
 
126 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11728, 9 June 1910. 
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decided to hire a representative for the Company, U. Cazius, to inform the company about the 
development of legislation concerning concessions and plantations in the Archipelago.131 
Lastly, P.C. van Steyn was hired as superintendent in the first plantations and assistant to 
Stoof.132 They were sent to the Archipelago in the beginning of 1911. 
Activities in the Archipelago took off quickly. Soon, however, Stoof reported negative 
news from the Dutch East Indies. As mentioned, the large list of requests for concessions led 
to indignation among civil servants in Batavia responsible for the land concessions.133 Marinus 
tried to convince these officials that the initial capital was only meant for activities related to 
the discovery of and drawing borders around suitable areas. If concessions were granted, 
Marinus stated, a large capital increase was to follow.134  
Against the Board’s expectations, requests by the company did not receive priority as 
promised in The Hague. Applying for requests even became problematic because of two 
clauses. First, the maximum size of a concessions was limited by the Dutch East India 
Government to 5.000 bouws or 3.500 hectares. This meant that the Syndicate and its employees 
had to split their requests into concessions of this size, resulting in more work and higher costs. 
The second cause was the already discussed bebouwingsclausule. 
These two barriers resulted into an inhibitory effect for the Syndicate. Firstly, it meant 
that not only the application for concessions would become more costly because of the extra 
work, the compliance with legislation also entailed extra costs. Secondly, on the one hand the 
company’s employees became more critical when inspecting grounds for later usage, on the 
other hand, government officials and civil servants took more time inspect the process. Because 
of the small share capital of the company, government officials decided to place the Syndicate 
and its agents on equal footing with the other companies that applied for concessions. This 
resulted in the first definitive concession only being completed in the beginning of 1912.135 
 
The creation, exploitation and management of the company’s plantations 
The problems that had arisen when applying for and receiving concessions forced the Board to 
spend its capital in a different way. The first two plantations were not created by the Syndicate 
itself, but were two of the three plantations bought throughout the years of its existence. In May 
1911, the Board of Commissioners agreed to purchase the two plantations from the Si-Antar 
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Sumatra Rubber Company, of which Marinus was the director and sole shareholder. The 
plantations ‘Kerasaän’ and ‘Bah Bajoe’, both located near the city of Pematang Siantar in the 
residency of East Sumatra, were purchased for ƒ400.000,-.136 This investment contradicted the 
goal of the company, since it did not allow for the purchase of already existing plantations. Still 
the Board agreed because only a small beginning had been achieved for the exploitation of 
plantations. At the same time, this was the only way for the company to have a foothold on East 
Sumatra. Finally, Colijn argued that the revenues of these plantations could be used to reinvest 
in the other concessions that had been petitioned.137 
Marinus had already appointed H.R. Stünzi as superintendent for rubber production on 
these two plantations. Because of this reason, van Steyn decided to resign as superintendent for 
the company, even before starting his new appointment.138 Stünzi deemed the lands on 
Kerasaän and Bah Bajoe worthy for the cultivation of Hevea rubber, Liberia coffee, and 
Robusta coffee. The international demand and price for rubber had rapidly increased from the 
1908 onwards. As a result, estate production was also booming in the province of East 
Sumatra.139 Liberia coffee had already been planted on Kerasaän. Replacing the traditional 
Arabian coffee by the end of the 19th century, Liberia coffee had become increasingly popular 
throughout the whole Archipelago. Although Liberia coffee was not one of the main export 
products of East Sumatra, the small cultivation at Kerasaän would eventually bring in a constant 
revenue for the Syndicate.140 The cultivation of Robusta coffee was brought in from Java as a 
generally accepted form of expansion. Young Hevea rubber trees needed shadow, and because 
Robusta trees grew fast and were easy and cheap to maintain, it became the ideal “catch 
crop”.141 
When Kerasaän was bought it had 85 hectares of Liberia coffee and 300 hectares of 
Hevea rubber. B.C.H. Schreijner was the administrator, brought in from Java. He started with 
the preparation of an extra 230 hectares for cultivation. Furthermore, he created a small village 
the for coolies (indentured labourers). Bah Bajoe, on the other hand, was yet to be developed 
and its administrator, H. Hübler, started with the preparation of roughly 260 hectares for the 
cultivation of rubber.142 
 
136 NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11870. 
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 The Syndicate developed its own first plantation in September 1912, near the city of 
Pematang Siantar. Their tea superintendent, O. van Vloten, reported that the first concession of 
Bah Biroeng Oeloe was suitable for the cultivation of tea.143 J.C. Warns, its administrator, 
started with the deforestation of roughly 250 hectares of a total of 1.000 hectares.144 
Furthermore, the rubber cultivation at Kerasaän and Bah Bajoe was expanded to a total of 500 
hectares, with the same amount of Robusta coffee as catch crop.145 Because the Syndicate now 
owned three plantations near Pematang Siantar, the Board decided to open its first office in the 
city (map 2a). The administrators of the different plantations were now subordinate to a head-
administrator, M.J. Salm, who arrived in March 1913.146 
The three plantations slowly expanded and the harvests brought in small amounts of 
profit, which were reinvested in the company. In 1916, Kerasaän and Bah Bajoe had a combined 
total of 1.343 hectares planted with Hevea rubber and Robusta catch crop, while Bah Biroeng 
Oeloe had 645 hectares of tea. More importantly, the Board of Commissioners had agreed in 
1914 to build factories so that raw products could be processed.147 These factories were 
completed in 1916, and greatly expanded the output and value of these plantations.148 
In September 1916 the Syndicate opened its first plantation on one of their concessions 
in South Sumatra. Padang Karit was a Robusta coffee plantation, located in the Pagar Alam 
district in the residency Palembang (map 2c). The administration was assigned to J.C.F. Knapp, 
who began with the construction of a hospital, a factory, 40 kilometres of main road and a 
bridge.149 Lastly, Salm had resigned as head administrator of East Sumatra, and handed over 
his position to B.F. Cambier.150 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the year 1917 brought about significant changes for the 
Syndicate. When the N.H.M. decided to buy all the shares of the company, the commissioners 
of the Rothschilds group and the Royal Dutch Shell all resigned. This meant that the decision-
making process developed smoother than before.151 This resulted in the opening of three 
plantations in 1917. First, between the plantations of Kerasaän and Bah Bajoe, a new 
Robusta/Hevea plantation was opened, called Bandar Siantar. The Syndicate now owned three 
neighbouring plantations near the city of Pematang Siantar. Secondly, the tea plantation of Bah 
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Biroeng Oeloe also gained a neighbouring tea plantation called Penang Ratoes. Lastly, a third 
tea plantation, Permanangan, was opened in November 1917.152 
1918 was the year when the plantations of the Syndicate were really growing in size and 
number. The three coffee and rubber plantations on the East coast of Sumatra held 1.600 
hectares planted with rubber and 1.500 hectares with coffee (table 1a). Furthermore, the coffee 
factory at Kerasaän expanded, and the rubber factory at Bah Bajoe was finally finished. The 
three tea plantations had a combined area of 1.375 hectares planted, while the new head 
administrator, Cambier, had decided that rice had to be planted between the tea plants to feed 
the workforce.153 
In the province of Bencoolen in South Sumatra, three new plantations were opened in 
1918. A Robusta coffee plantation, Pematang Danau, was opened on a concession with the 
same name. Directly neighbouring this plantation, a small cinchona plantation, called Boekit 
Kaba was opened. Here, a beginning was made for a nursery garden and a factory. A new 
Robusta coffee plantation was opened on the concession of Aer Simpang, accompanied by the 
immediate construction of a main road, a bridge, and a factory. A fourth plantation was opened 
in the province of Palembang. Aer Temam, a Hevea rubber plantation, was opened on a 
concession with the same name, located in the district of Moeara Bliti. Because of its central 
position between all other plantations, a hospital was built to serve the local workforce and their 
families.154 Lastly, because the provinces of Palembang and Bencoolen now had a total of seven 
plantations spread over a vast amount of land, the Board decided to open a second office in 
Palembang. The same construction was used as in East Sumatra, with all different 
administrators now being subordinate to a head administrator.155 For the East coast of Sumatra, 
this was Cambier, successor of Salm. Jhr. A.J.B. van Suchtelen van de Haaremedio was named 
head administrator of South Sumatra.156 These head administrators were subordinated to the 
second, newly appointed director, M.J. Salm.157 
In 1919, several experimentations took place. The Syndicate’s first palm oil plantation 
was opened on the concession of Taba Pingin. It was the section plantation in the district of 
Moeara Bliti. Furthermore, at the tea plantation of Bah Biroeng Oeloe, a factory for the 
withering of tea was finished. This resulted in even faster processing of the cultivated tea. At 
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the tea plantation of Penang Ratoes, a nursery garden was built to test out new sorts of tea. At 
Bandar Siantar, a new form of draining was tested out. Lastly, on the concession near Aer 
Maoeng, the first cattle breeding farm of the region was completed.158  
Bah Aliran was the third purchased plantation by the Syndicate. The tea plantation, 
located near Bah Biroeng Oeloe, already had a factory for the processing of tea and 200 hectares 
planted with tea in 1920. Its administrator, N.W. van der Voogt, decided to improve the factory, 
and to drastically expand the amount of planted hectares. The Syndicate now owned a total of 
fourteen plantations, spread out over three different provinces. The amount of hectares planted 
totalled by then: 2.200 hectares of Hevea rubber, 3.350 hectares of Robusta and Liberia coffee, 
2.300 hectares of tea, and 300 hectares of palm oil (table 1a).159 
Financially however, the company was struggling and results were not as desired. The 
Syndicate had made a loss of over ƒ600.000,- in 1920 alone and the total loan of the N.H.M. 
totalled nearly ƒ15.000.000,- (figure 3).160 As a result, Salm had resigned as second director. 
The Board ordered Marinus to travel to the East Indies to report on the state of affairs on 
Sumatra. 161 Half a year later, Marinus had fired the head administrator of the office in East 
Sumatra, as well as some of the administrators. Furthermore, as temporary head administrator 
of East Sumatra, he argued that the plantations Kerasaän and Permanangan should expand.162 
The head administrator of South Sumatra argued otherwise. He stated that Taba Pingin and Aer 
Maoeng needed to be sold, that the company’s accountancy needed modernisation, and that 
further cultivation was not necessary.163 
The director of the N.H.M. and commissioner for the Syndicate, van Aalst, decided to 
go with the advice from Van Suchtelen. Van Aalst stated that heavy cuts were needed for 1921. 
The cattle farm Aer Maoeng was abandoned and the grounds given back to the Dutch East India 
Government. The plantation of Bandar Siantar was split up and divided over Kerasaän and Bah 
Bajoe. This resulted in a faster development of the lands of Bandar Siantar. The accountants in 
the Dutch East Indies were fired. Instead, the accountancy system was adopted from the 
N.H.M.. Two accountants of the N.H.M. were sent to the Dutch East Indies, who reported to a 
head-accountant in the Netherlands. The accounts were now double checked, and the yearly 
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reports were delivered in a timely fashion. Expansion of new plantations and construction of 
new factories was halted. Taba Pingin, however, was not sold.164  
Notwithstanding these changes, between 1921 and 1925, the tea factory at 
Permanangan, the coffee factories at Pematang Danau and Aer Simpang, and the kina factory 
at Boekit Kaba were finished. The already existing plantations gradually expanded their 
cultivated areas (figure 1), although no new plantations were created. This package of changes 
increased the value and output of the plantations, and minimalized the losses made by the 
company (figures 2 and 3).165 
In 1926, president-commissioner van Aalst proposed to the Board to sell all the rubber 
plantations. The main reason behind this advice was the fact that in 1926 several quality 
inspections were issued for the production of rubber. This had to stimulate and improve the 
export quality of rubber in the Archipelago. As a result, the processing facilities near the 
plantations had to be improved to meet these inspections.166 Van Aalst argued that this 
investment was too expensive for the company and for that reason the only reasonable decision 
was to sell these plantations. The Board agreed and gave Marinus permission to sell these 
plantations.167 Two offers by English companies were declined.168 The plantations Kerasaän, 
Bah Bajoe, and Aer Temam were eventually sold to the Societé Internationale de Plantations 
et de Finance, a Belgian company with the same purpose as the Syndicate.169 The plantations 
were sold with a profit of nearly ƒ900.000,-. Since these plantations also produced coffee (table 
1b), the company also lost the largest part of its coffee production.  
From 1927 onwards, the Supervisory Board was replaced by a Board of Directors. This 
also had consequences for the positions on Sumatra. The positions of director and head 
administrators were removed. The company was from then on represented by an agent from 
Medan. This person, M.J. Herbschleb, had to enact the decisions made by the Board. In contrast 
to the former position of Director, he did not have authority to make decisions of his own.170 
The existing the plantations came under control of inspector. J.C. Groenenberg, who was 
responsible for further development of all of the company’s plantations, he was also responsible 
for doing research for the development of better pesticides and tea species.171  
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It was Groenenberg who convinced the Board of the Syndicate to shift attention from 
the cultivation of coffee to further development of its tea and palm oil plantations.172 A new tea 
plantation was opened on one of the company’s concessions on the east coast of Sumatra near 
the city of Pematang Siantar, called Hilang Oeloe. Immediately the construction of a factory 
began, as well as a nursery for research purposes. In the same year, the factory at the palm oil 
plantation of Taba Pingin was finished.173 
The cultivated acres of tea gradually expanded and in 1930 another new tea plantation 
was opened. Bah Boetong neighboured the earlier plantation of Hilang Oeloe, and was also 
developed on a concession owned by the Syndicate. Because of Groenenberg’s dedication, it 
became the fastest developed plantation of the company, with over 1.000 hectares cultivated 
and a factory built within the first year of its existence. Meanwhile, in the same period, the 
cultivated hectares of palm oil at Taba Pingin were doubled, while the coffee cultivation slowly 
decreased (figure 1).174  
In May 1930, a restriction was put on the cultivation of tea by the Dutch East India 
Government.175 Therefore, Groenenberg decided that further expansion of the tea plantations 
was not necessary (figure 1). Instead, to reduce administrative costs, he argued that the merging 
of the already existing tea plantations was the most wise decision. This led to the merging of 
the plantations Bah Aliran and Bah Biroeng Oeloe in 1932, leaving the latter with a total of 
1.600 hectares. In the same year, the newest plantations Hilang Oeloe and Bah Boetong, 
continued under the name of Bah Boetong. This plantation now had a cultivated area of over 
2.100 hectares of tea and the most modern factory of the Syndicate. In 1935 the grounds of 
Penang Ratoes were added to Permanangan, totalling 1.915 hectares.176  
On the plantations in South Sumatra not much changed over the course of the years. By 
1935, the cinchona plantation of Boekit Kaba had been expanded and the factory was 
modernised. Further expansion of this plantation was not allowed because of the cinchona 
ordonnance of 1934, which set a maximum of 335 planted hectares per plantation.177 The palm 
oil plantation of Taba Pingin also expanded and its factory modernised. In order to improve 
transportation, 44 kilometres of railroad track were laid. The Board decided that preparations 
had to be made to abandon cultivation on the coffee plantations of Pematang Danau and Aer 
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Simpang because of disappointing results. The latter was eventually abandoned and the grounds 
given back to the Dutch East India Government in 1937.178 
by the end of 1938, the Syndicate owned seven plantations in four different 
commodities. In East Sumatra the administration of the company maintained three tea 
plantations, each with their own factory for processing, and with a total amount of 5.629 
hectares cultivated (map 2a).179 The administration in South Sumatra had four plantations under 
its control. Two of these were located in the province of Palembang. These were the oil 
plantation of Taba Pingin in the district of Moeara Bliti and the coffee plantation Padang Karit 
in Pagar-Alam. The other two were located in the province of Bencoolen, a cinchona plantation 
Boekit Kaba and a another coffee plantation Pematang Danau (map 2b&c). Again, all 
plantations had their own factories for processing. The amount of hectares planted with coffee 
totalled 1.060, the amount of cinchona was 352 ha, and the amount of palm oil was 1.698 
hectares.180 
 
Obtaining, developing and selling concessions 
The lack of capital, the maximum size of the concessions, and the bebouwingsclausule forced 
a review of Stoof’s petitions. This review was meant to minimize costs were minimalized and 
only the best plots of land were requested. In the beginning of 1912, Stoof stated that he found 
it difficult to work together with van Steyn because their opinions often differed.181 Stoof would 
rather work alone. The Board disagreed and fired Stoof. So it was van Steyn that became 
responsible for the review and the new petitions for concessions.182  
The first concession was received by mid-1912 and turned into the tea plantation Bah 
Biroeng Oeloe. The other concessions, were not as easily conceded as expected. The process 
of requesting a plot of land became very time consuming. Van Steyn first had to decide whether 
or not a plot was suitable for cultivation. He then had to petition for the plot at the Dutch East 
India Government. When granted, the Syndicate received a ‘provisional’ concession. This 
meant that boundary posts had to be placed, a map of the plot had to be drawn up, including 
details such as the living area for workers and accessibilities (roads mostly).183  
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By the end of 1913, van Steyn had received eight provisional requests in the residencies 
of Bencoolen and Palembang, with a combined total of 40.000 bouws.184 The Board, although 
pleased with his work, decided not to renew his contract in 1914.185 Colijn, in a personal letter, 
asked him to return to the Netherlands and to hand over his work to Salm, who was then head 
administrator of the company in the Archipelago.186 Salm decided that it was best that he hired 
agents to check if plots were deemed suitable for cultivation. If he thought a concession was 
suitable, he filed a request with the Government, whilst instructing the agent to start with 
mapping and defining boundaries. Thörig would then visit to check on the proceedings and 
make amends if necessary.187 
Salm’s new system worked out and by the end of 1915, nineteen provisional requests in 
the residencies of Bencoolen and Palembang, with a combined total of 43.000 hectares, were 
nearly completed. In 1916, nine of these nineteen provisional requests were fully mapped and 
marked out by the agents and were granted as concessions by the colonial government. Four of 
these, with a combined total of 10.700 hectares , were located in Bencoolen (map 3b). The other 
five had a combined total of roughly 7.150 hectares and were located in Palembang (map 3c). 
The grounds were suitable for the cultivation of tea, coffee, rubber, and coconuts.188  
In 1917, eight out of the remaining eleven concessions were granted; another four in 
Bencoolen with a total of a little over 7.150 hectares, and another four in Palembang with a 
total of 10.000 hectares. By the end of 1917, the Syndicate owned seventeen concessions, 
accumulating almost 35.000 hectares, suitable for different kinds of products.189 In the same 
year, one month after the N.H.M. bought all the shares of the company, Salm made a 
proposition to the Board. In exchange for another ƒ750.000,- in shares, the Syndicate should 
take over seven concessions from the N.H.M. in the regency of Simalungun, located in the 
residency of East Sumatra (map 3a). This would not only expand the share capital of the 
company, but also place the Syndicate at the service of the N.H.M.190 Within two years, the 
Syndicate owned 24 concessions in three different residencies with a combined total of 47.418 
hectares on Sumatra. On two of these, plantations were immediately opened. 
The last concession was granted in 1918. After that, the Board decided to stop applying 
for concessions on Sumatra, and instead focused on the development of their attained assets. 
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The concessions that had been provisionally remained in the portfolio. Four plantations were 
opened on the concessions in Bencoolen and Palembang in that same year, and the other 
concessions were prepared for the same goal. These preparations included deforestation, 
controlled burning of parts of the forest to ensure good crop growth, the construction and 
maintenance of simple drainages, as well as the construction of roads, bridges and small 
buildings.191 In the same year, commissioner van Aalst thought it would be wise to move onto 
the island of Celebes, “which is to be considered to be of great national importance.”192 The 
Board agreed, and decided to send an agent to the Celebes to look for suitable grounds for the 
exploitation of coconuts and copra. 
From 1919 to the beginning of 1921, not much happened concerning the concessions. 
In 1919, two concessions were turned into plantations and the others were further developed. 
In 1921, the last provisional concessions were finished. Six new concessions were granted in 
the residency of East Sumatra. Two of these were located in the regency of Simalungun, the 
third in the regency just south of Simalungun, called Tapanuli. The other three were located in 
the regency to the west of Simalungun, called Asahan.193 The Syndicate now detained roughly 
50.000 hectares of concessions. This, however, would be the maximum of concessions the 
Syndicate would ever own.  
During a meeting between the commissioners of the Board and director Marinus in 
1923, it was commissioner Vester who stated that the results of the company were disappointing 
(figure 3). He argued that it was in the company’s best interest to stop petitions for new 
concessions and rationalize the concessions already granted. The ones that were deemed 
unusable needed to be sold. If that was not possible, they were to be given back to the 
government. This also meant that applications for concessions on Celebes were dropped.194 In 
the same month, two concessions in Palembang were given back to the government for a 
compensation of ƒ4,89 per hectare, a price that was far lower than its market value.195 
In August 1924, the other five concessions Palembang were returned to the government, 
finishing the company’s investment in that residency. The Syndicate had invested heavily in 
these concessions, but still did not demand compensation from the government. Even though 
the concessions were fully ready to be turned into plantations, the Syndicate’s representative in 
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Palembang was unable to sell them for a market price.196 Meanwhile, the Board had ordered 
the head administrator in East Sumatra to start negotiations with the Handels Vereeniging 
Amsterdam (H.V.A.) for the sale of five concessions in Simalungun (map 3a).197  
This deal was completed a year later. The five concessions totalled a little over 10.000 
hectares. The value per hectare was estimated at ƒ92,30, but the H.V.A. offered the Syndicate 
ƒ172,83 per hectare. This resulted in a profit of ƒ808.275,49 for the company. After almost 
fifteen years, the company had successfully sold some of its concessions.198 
After the deal with the H.V.A., the company only successfully sold plots of land twice. 
The first time in 1928, when the Syndicate sold 272 hectares in the regency of Asahan to the 
Dutch East India Government. The profit totalled ƒ16.249,37.199 The second time, precisely 
one year later the concession of Tapanuli was sold, instead of returned, to the Government. 
Although suitable for exploitation, its remote location made it unattractive for the company to 
open a plantation on this concession. The total amount of 2.821 hectares was sold with a profit 
of ƒ94.815,33.200 
By 1929, the Syndicate only had 17.000 hectares of concessions left, meaning that it 
had 66% less compared to 1921 when it totalled 50.000 hectares. Of these, only 13.000 hectares, 
or 40%, was sold with a profit. The other 60% was simply given back to the government. The 
management of the company deemed that the concessions that they still owned were the most 
valuable. They were right, but their representatives were unable to sell the ten plots of land the 
Syndicate still had left.  
In January of 1930 the three concessions in the regency of Asahan were given back to 
the government.201 The agent also failed to sell four concessions with a total area of 4.000 
hectares in the residency of Bencoolen, and these were also given back to the government.202 
The last two concessions in Bencoolen, in the hands of the company since 1917, were given 
back to the government in 1934 “since exploitation of the grounds in the near future is ruled 
out”.203 After that date, the Syndicate only owned one last concession, located near the 
plantation Bah Boetong in the residency of East Sumatra. As it was described in the yearly 
report, the situation of “trying to sell the remaining concessions” had now changed to: “an 
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attempt is made to return the concession still in our possession […] to the government, as it has 
become apparent that it has no value for us.”204 The government refused to take back the 
concession, since it was unsuitable for a plantation because it was too small, and too large to be 
used a public space. The problem was only solved when in 1937, after one part of the concession 
was added to the nearby plantation, whilst the rest was used to build a village for the workers 
on the plantation.205 
 
The financial participation in other companies that envisaged the same goal 
During the first years, the Syndicate received multiple offers from other companies to buy 
unexploited plots of land and received invitations to partake in new companies. Almost all of 
these offers and invitations were declined, not only because these invitations were often 
unattractive because of climate or location, but mainly due to the fact that they collided with 
the original goal of the Syndicate, namely the exploitation of land received from the 
Government, or at least to reserve the available resources as much as possible for that 
purpose.206 There were some exceptions to this, and these have already been discussed in this 
chapter. First, the acquisition of the two plantations Kerasaän and Bah Bajoe from the Si-Antar 
Sumatra Rubber Company in 1911. Second, the purchase of the tea plantation Bah Aliran in 
1919. Lastly, the acquisition of small plots of land bordering the plantation of Pematang Danau, 
also in 1919. There were, however, some other instances when the Syndicate participated in 
different kinds of organizations. This differed from participation in other companies, the 
development and testing of new patents, participation in hospital associations, and participation 
in institutions that aimed at the overall improvement of trade in different types of raw materials 
in specific regions of the Archipelago. The next part of this chapter will discuss these four 
different groups in greater detail. 
The first financial participation of the Syndicate was a share in the founding of the 
General Dutch East India Tea Culture Society (N.V. Algemeene Nederlandsch-Indische Thee-
Cultuur Maatschappij). This company was founded on 6 March 1911, with a share capital of 
ƒ2.500.000,-.207 The goal of the company was to promote the tea culture in the whole 
Archipelago, and it started with the purchase of a tea plantation in the Preanger region on West 
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Java.208 H.J. Stoof, the Syndicate’s representative in the Dutch East Indies, advised the Board 
to participate in the Tea Culture Society. He argued, that once the Syndicate’s new tea 
plantations were up and running, they could eventually be sold to this company. The Board 
agreed, and invested ƒ90.000,- in the Tea Culture Society in 1911.209 However, the deal fell 
through. While the tea plantations of the Syndicate kept expanding and kept showing good 
progress, the Tea Culture Society did develop much.210 Continuous draught and diseases on its 
plantations stopped company to gain any profits, let alone expand its business. In 1924, the debt 
of the company was as high as 75% of its share capital, and it went into liquidation.211 The 
Syndicate had already sold its shares in 1919 with a loss of ƒ10.000,-.212 
The second financial participation of the Syndicate dates to 1912. The Society for Fibre 
Industry was founded in July 1912. Its goal was to develop a new process for the cultivation of 
fibres. This also included the development and testing of a new machine for the processing of 
these fibres.213 The enterprise was led by G.M.E. Pos, an inventor from Haarlem. He contacted 
the Syndicate’s director J.H. Marinus and president commissioner J.B. van Heutsz to propose 
a partnership. Both of them agreed to buy the last ƒ10.000,- worth of shares out of a share 
capital of ƒ80.000,-.214 This agreement excluded the consent of the other commissioners of the 
Syndicate. This resulted in negligence from the commissioners, especially van Aalst, when the 
plans of the company were discussed during meetings.215 The Society for Fiber was short lived 
as many mistakes were made from the beginning. Shortly after the founding meeting, Pos was 
send to the Archipelago to search for decent grounds for the cultivation of fibres. As a result, 
he ordered another company to build the machine he invented. When the machine was finished, 
the Board of the Society immediately send it to Sumatra without proper testing. Meanwhile, 
Pos had not found suitable grounds in the Archipelago and the Board had ordered him to 
purchase grounds that were not fertile enough. This resulted in bad harvests two years later. 
When it turned out the machine did not work properly either, the company filed for 
liquidation.216  
The last participation of the Syndicate in other companies was the creation of the 
International Plantation Syndicate (Het Internationaal Plantage Syndicaat), after a keen 
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suggestion by Marinus in November 1927.217 This new Syndicate had the exact same goals and 
articles of association as the Dutch East India Land Syndicate. It was Marinus’ idea to put all 
the plantations in the residencies of Palembang and Bencoolen (map 2b &2c), as well as the 
local hospital, its administration, and concessions under the control of the new Syndicate. As a 
compensation, the Dutch East India Land Syndicate would receive 25% of the shares in the new 
Syndicate, while the rest would be paid “in cash”. As a result, the debt the Syndicate to the 
N.H.M. would decrease. The other partners were foreign companies, located in Berlin, New 
York, Basel, and Brussels. As a result, Marinus stated: “[…] the Dutch East India Land 
Syndicate and the N.H.M. would remain in control and enjoy the side benefits, while spreading 
out the financial risks.”218 The proposal for this new syndicate were rejected, though. Firstly, 
the influence of foreign investors was the exact opposite of the goal of Syndicate. Secondly, the 
fact that risks were spread out instead of reduced, resulted in two financially weaker companies 
instead of one with a stronger financial position, according to the Management Board. Lastly, 
and probably the most understandable reason, the Board argued that Marinus had come up with 
this plan to save his own investment by becoming director of a new, smaller company. During 
the meeting where this plan was discussed only Van Aalst, still director of the N.H.M., agreed 
with the proposal because the debt of the Syndicate would decrease. The other commissioners 
did not and the plan abandoned before it even started.219  
 
Spillovers and Linkages 
Apart from the intentional influence on local economy and society, the Syndicate provoked 
unintended change. Scholars investing economic development have used different theories to 
measure whether investments by  foreign firms lead to economic development. One of these 
theories is the so-called ‘spillover effect’ according to which foreign firms entering into a local 
economy showcase new technologies to local firms or entrepreneurs. It must be noted that this 
effect can only occur when foreign firms share in the gains of increased productivity that result 
from this technological transfer. The term ‘spillover’ must be used with caution, since it is hard 
to measure how different parties benefited from technological diffusion. This measurement is 
even more difficult when diffusion is involuntary. When studying the Dutch East Indies as a 
whole, it is difficult to find solid evidence that spillover effects were significant in the 19th and 
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early 20th centuries. However, the spillover effect of a foreign company on a local, smaller 
society might have had a significant impact.  
In the case of the Syndicate, two voluntary cases of spillover are apparent. In 1916 a 
thorough inspection was ordered by the Government of the Dutch East Indies on the medical 
treatment of workers and the organisation of hospitals in the regency of Bencoolen. The results 
were appalling, according to the inspectors. Coolies were exposed to numerous illnesses like 
cholera and stomach diseases. This was, according to the inspector, mainly caused by the poor 
provisioning of foodstuffs, especially rice. The rice that was imported for the coolies was 
mouldy, shrivelled and moisty. The coolies themselves had no time to grow their own rice 
because there was neither suitable ground nor suitable time to do so.220 
Two years later, in 1918, the Syndicate received a warning by the Public Health 
Authority for the Dutch East Indies. The company had not taken the necessary steps to improve 
the medical situation and living conditions of the workers by neglecting to provide for food 
supply. Since importing rice had proven too costly because of high transportation costs to the 
remote plantations, the administrator of one of the plantations decided to cultivate foodstuffs 
(rice, corn and potatoes) on parts of the estate that was not being used or deemed unsuitable for 
the production of tea.221 He ordered the coolies to care for their own crops, while the Syndicate 
would then pay for the seeds and tools. The administrators taught the head planters how to dig 
trenches and the best techniques for the planting and the nurturing of these plants. These head 
planters then passed this information to the coolies working on the plantations. This plan was 
implemented within two years in all the plantations owned by the Syndicate. The plantations 
that did not have enough space were supplied by the others in the area. Both parties benefitted 
from this plan. It was cheaper for the Syndicate to supply the coolies with the necessary 
equipment rather than to import the expensive rice from other places. The medical situation of 
the coolies improved in a very short period of time.222 Furthermore, and in the long run, the 
coolies were able to profit from the acquired knowledge and in a few years they were able to 
produce a surplus of foodstuffs that was sold to plantations in the area.223 
The second case of voluntary diffusion of technology can be found on a couple of tea 
plantations owned by the Syndicate. Once again, it was the administrator of the Bah Biroeng 
Oeloe plantation who came up with the idea of devoting a small area for testing new methods 
of planting, nurturing and harvesting tea. The Syndicate would supply the coolies with the tools, 
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while the administrator would discuss the new methods with the head planter. The tea produced 
in these areas was then purchased by the Syndicate from the coolies at a fair price. The idea 
was implemented in Bah Biroeng Oeloe, Penang Ratoes and Aer Simpang and it became a 
success. In 1928 the total production of the so called ‘coolie tea’ amounted to nearly eight 
percent of the total production of tea. Its quality was slightly lower though, so it made up little 
over four percent of the yearly profit made on tea. When the tea restriction was implemented in 
1930, the Syndicate stopped buying the tea from the coolies. The administrators did allow the 
coolies to produce and sell their own grown tea to other possible buyers, while still paying for 
the production costs and supplies.224 
Note that these two cases of spillovers are both voluntary. During the enlargement and 
development of its plantations, the Syndicate willingly provided the coolies with the necessary 
knowledge and payed for the production costs. The same reasoning is far more complex when 
thinking of involuntary technological diffusion. There are cases on Borneo where ex-coolies 
and supervisors were selling their gained knowledge on the planting and tapping of rubber trees 
to other new planters.225 However, the archive of the Syndicate does not provide anecdotal 
evidence of ex-coolies or indigenous supervisors using the gained knowledge as a source of 
income by selling it to other planters or competitors in the region.  
Apart from spillovers, there is another theory by which the Syndicate could stimulate 
the local economy in which they operated. As Hirschman argued, through forward and 
backward linkages, a leading sector could stimulate investments and thus development in other 
sectors.226 A forward linkage means that investment by a company leady to further investment 
by another company which uses the output of the former as its input. In the case of the Syndicate 
this did not happen. Almost all plantations had their own factories for processing. So the 
Syndicate processed its own cultivated coffee, rubber, tea, cinchona, and oil on the spot. As a 
result, the Syndicate did not stimulate the development of factories owned by other companies 
in the region. This corresponds to what has been argued by scholars of colonial Indonesia as 
they argue that export industries only created a few forward linkages, mainly in the processing 
of raw oil.227 
Backward linkages did have a larger impact on the economy of the Dutch East Indies. 
A backward linkage is the result from a leading sector using the input of other local industries. 
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For instance, when a company needs food and housing for its labour force, these can be supplied 
locally or they can be imported. If the materials are imported, it nullifies the local growth effect. 
On the contrary, if these materials are produced locally, it creates a backward linkage. The 
Syndicate did try to buy as many materials locally as they could. To import all building 
materials proved to be too costly, since most of the plantations lay in remote areas. Heavy 
machinery and cars were shipped to the plantations by the N.H.M. Still, most materials were 
acquired in the region, mostly for the construction of factories. From 1928 onwards, the 
Syndicate started building houses for the labour force and bought the wood from the indigenous 
workers that were cultivating the surrounding concessions. The Syndicate also approached the 
Deli Railway Company to build railways to the plantations. As a result, the shipping process to 
the coast was made easier and faster. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the activities of the Syndicate as described in their main goals, 
namely: the creation, exploitation and management of plantations; obtaining and selling land 
concessions; and the financial participation in other companies that envisaged the same goal. 
During the first year of the Syndicate’s presence in the Archipelago, agents had petitioned for 
a little over 500.000 hectares of concessions. However, it was not easy for the Syndicate to get 
those concessions. Local civil servants unwilling to cooperate, and thus every petition turned 
out to be a long, painstaking process of measuring and defining boundaries. In 1923 the 
Syndicate reached its peak as far as size is concerned. Throughout three different residencies, 
it owned 25 concessions with a total acreage of roughly 50.000 hectares, and 14 plantations on 
which 10.000 hectares were planted with rubber, tea, coffee, cinchona and palm oil (table 1). 
By 1936, the company had given back all their concessions to the government, and only owned 
seven plantations, with roughly 8.500 hectares planted. 
The development and cultivation of the Syndicate’s concessions and plantations in the 
residences of Sumatra’s East coast, Bencoolen and Palembang follows the average economic 
development of the Outer Islands. After the First World War, the infrastructure saw a rapid 
development in the Outer Islands, and especially on Sumatra. This development resulted in 
easier access to concessions and thus the starting of new plantations. The amount of concessions 
granted to companies reached its peak in 1925, with roughly 3.000.000 hectares.228 This period 
was followed by a period of stagnation. The amount of concessions stayed the same, but a 
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growing amount of hectares were being planted with crops. During the crisis of the 1930s, many 
plots of land were returned to the government, especially on Sumatra.229 
In conclusion, the activities and development of the Syndicate in the Archipelago tends 
to follow the administrative changes back in Netherlands. The company expanded rapidly after 
the Rothschild and the Royal Dutch/Shell Group had left the company in 1917, and consolidated 
its possessions after the N.H.M. had fully taken over roughly a decade later. Throughout these 
years, the Syndicate was able to stimulate local economic growth and help the indigenous 
population on a small scale via voluntary technological diffusion and backward linkages, whilst 
exploiting their labour potential.
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Chapter 3: A combination of business and politics 
There were some moments when the Board and Directors of the Syndicate tried to receive 
exemptions regarding specific legislation from the Minister of Colonies and the Dutch East 
India Government. At the same time, European personnel faced difficulties and even opposition 
by local civil servants responsible for the granting of concessions. In both cases, politics and 
economics seem to have mutually influenced the outcomes in the results of the Syndicate. 
There is, yet, another case when politics stood in the way of the Syndicate, and 
especially of Colijn. He had become a member of the Dutch House of Representatives as the 
East Indies specialist for the Anti Revolutionary Party, and became director for the Syndicate a 
little over a year later. Some other politicians in the House of Representatives found this 
relationship between politics and business ethically reproachable. This chapter looks closely 
into these ‘clashes’ between politics and business in greater detail. 
 
‘Indische Jongens’ 
The founding entrepreneurs of the Syndicate consisted of six men: Marinus, Colijn, Deterding, 
Loudon, Cohen Stuart, and Van Aalst. Apart from Marinus, all men had known each other for 
a long time. The same is true for those men that joined the Supervisory Board at a later stage. 
Deterding and van Aalst had been working as agents for the N.H.M. in the Archipelago since 
1888. Deterding started working for the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company in 1896 and became 
president in 1902. In the same year, van Aalst became director of the N.H.M. In 1913, van Aalst 
became president of the N.H.M. 230 He also became a supervisory director for the Royal Dutch 
in 1910.231 Loudon had been working in the Dutch East Indies as Head of Administration for 
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company since 1894, and became director of the company in 
1902.232 Cohen Stuart, who did not spend time in the Dutch East Indies, worked as a lawyer for 
the Royal Dutch and became director in 1906.233 
By 1910, Colijn did not have experience in business or in politics. He served in the 
Royal Dutch East India Army for most of his life, and was responsible for the civil 
administration in some parts of Aceh. From 1904 onwards, his career gained momentum, both 
in business and in politics. In 1904 he became deputy to the Governor-General Van Heutsz. 
From 1907 to 1909 Colijn served as his personal secretary and advisor. In 1910, he became a 
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member of the House of Representatives for the Anti-Revolutionary Party and a year later he 
became Minister of War. By 1920, he had been managing director for the Batavian Petroleum 
Company for six years, a member of the Dutch Senate for six years, and had just become the 
party leader of the A.R.P. 234 During these years, the Board was joined by Van Heutsz (1911) 
and Idenburg (1917). As mentioned before, van Heutsz served as Governor-General of the 
Dutch East Indies until 1909, while his successor, Idenburg, served as Governor-General until 
1916. 
All the Syndicate’s commissioners started their careers, or spent a long time in the 
Archipelago. Therefore, Werkman and van der Woude call the Board of the Syndicate a group 
of Indische Jongens.235 As previously mentioned, some men resigned as commissioner and left 
this group being then replaced by Vester, who had become director of the N.H.M. in 1918 and 
who would succeed to van Aalst as president in 1934.236 When the Supervisory Board changed 
to a Board of Directors (1927), all new members were directors of the N.H.M., namely; J. 
Bierens de Haan (1918-1933), J.C.A. Everwijn (1922-1929), D. Crena de Iongh (1925-1934), 
M. Taudin Chabot (1929-1946), A.A. Pauw (1930-1946), and C.J. baron Collet d’Escury (1934-
1948).237 
All these men were members of what Arjen Taselaar calls the ‘core elite’, a group of 
143 men who formed the top of business and industry in the Dutch East Indies. Many of these 
men had multiple positions, such as director or commissioner, in different companies, and at 
the same time. Van Aalst was a commissioner for the K.P.M. as well as for the Royal Dutch 
Shell, while acting as director for the N.H.M.238 According to Taselaar these elite formed a 
network which can be divided in thirteen different clusters, of which the N.H.M. was the most 
important. Other clusters are for instance, the mining, the oil production and the shipping 
sectors.239 This resulted in a far-reaching cooperation between the largest companies in their 
respective sectors, alienating the need for the creation of business interest associations.240  
 
The benefits of a business network 
The presence of this business elite had some direct benefits for the Syndicate. First and 
foremost, the company was able to find European personnel easily for all the necessary 
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positions in a short amount of time. On a yearly basis, commissioner van Aalst provided the 
company with a large list of suitable applicants for positions such as head-administrator, 
secretary, and administrator. Almost all of these man were working or were former employees 
of the N.H.M..241 Secondly, as demonstrated in chapter 1, commissioner Deterding was able to 
rapidly find suitable investors via the Royal Dutch Shell. Lastly, the Syndicate did not need to 
partake in business interest associations in the Archipelago, apart one small occasion.  
The larger companies in the Dutch East Indies did not have to rely on trade associations 
because of their strong cooperation and network. These companies often solved labour conflicts 
by themselves, and exchanged technological systems when needed, especially in shipping and 
oil extraction. This was not the case, however, for the smaller companies that exploited and 
managed plantations. Although the export agriculture in the Archipelago did not need large 
operating systems, technological advances and scientific progress did become more important 
by the end of the nineteenth century. Therefore, plantation owners united in business 
associations. These associations represented the common labour and technological interests of 
the associated plantations. A good example is the establishment of local laboratories, in which, 
for instance, better planting techniques were tested. Furthermore, it provided these smaller 
companies with a stronger case against policies from the Dutch East India Government.242 
Because of the strong geographical dispersion of plantations in the Archipelago, the 
business interest associations were organized for a longer period of time on a regional scale. In 
1910, the General Association of Rubber Planters of the East Coast of Sumatra (Algemeene 
Vereeniging van Rubberplanters ter Oostkust van Sumatra, A.V.R.O.S.) was founded. 
Plantations in South Sumatra united themselves in the South-Sumatra Agriculture and Industry 
Association (Zuid-Sumatra Landbouw- en Nijverheidsvereniging). In 1900, the General Coffee 
Syndicate (Algemeen Koffiesyndicaat) was founded. This was reorganized in 1908, and 
recalled the Dutch East India Agriculture Syndicate (Nederlands-Indisch Landbouw Syndicate, 
N.I.L.S.).243 
The main reason why the Syndicate was not a member of any of these business interest 
associations is because the commissioners wanted to resolve matters on their own grounds. It 
was common knowledge at the time that cooperation within the associations was difficult and 
led to and increasing amount of problems.244 In the case of Sumatra, the laboratories worked 
within confined areas. Since the Syndicate’s plantations were located all over the island they 
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had been forced to become a member of different, smaller laboratory associations. This 
unpractical and inefficient solution isolated the Syndicate with the result that since all 
laboratories were essentially researching the same issues, keeping up with findings and 
improvements was almost impossible. This led to a serious fragmentation of the scientific 
labour force.245 The Syndicate then decided a new approach. It ordered the construction of 
laboratories for the Syndicate alone. The N.H.M. was able to provide a suitable labour force 
and work resumed. 
There was one occasion when the Board decided to become a member of a business 
interest association, upon the instalment of the Association for Tea Cultivation in the Dutch 
East Indies (Vereeniging voor de Thee-Cultuur in Nederlandsch-Indië). This association was 
based in Amsterdam and founded in 1918. The Board thought it would benefit the Syndicate as 
they had only then started tea production. However, in the years that followed, the company 
was unable to profit from the tea plantations, and, since the membership fee of the association 
was linked to the amount of hectares planted and thus relatively high, the Board decided to drop 
out.246 
 
Lobbying for exemptions 
Before the Syndicate was founded, Colijn thought he would be able to use the network he had 
built up during his years in the Archipelago and as a member of the Anti-Revolutionary Party 
to gain benefits for the Syndicate. Especially in the first years of the Syndicate’s existence, 
Colijn, together with van Heutsz, tried to get exemptions from certain legislation. As mentioned 
in chapter 1, Colijn tried to get an exemption for the company on the ordonnance for leasehold, 
adopted in 1909.247 At first, the Minister of Colonies de Waal Malefijt and Governor-General 
Idenburg promised they would grant Colijn this exemption. This was revoked by Idenburg a 
little over a year later, because the Council of the Indies had rejected the exemption. 
Idenburg fell however short of modifying the leasehold ordonnance in a way as to 
benefit the Syndicate. If the total size of multiple petitions for concessions was equal to- or 
larger than 35.000 hectares, it was possible to receive the grounds in option for three years to 
find out whether or not the ground was suitable for exploitation. The company that received 
this privilege, got priority over others when petitioning for the leasehold. This reform of the 
ordonnance coincided closely with the founding of the Syndicate, and therefore it got the 
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attention of the Dutch press. The Java-Bode, an important newspaper in the Dutch East Indies, 
wrote in May 1911: “the licence for an exploration of this nature, which gives the holder, with 
priority over all others, the opportunity to acquire all the land situated within the complex on a 
long-term lease, can only be granted to capital-rich persons or companies […].”248 
The Syndicate had received another exemption, still. To promote the economy of the 
Archipelago, the Dutch East India Government did not levy taxes on newly granted concessions 
for a certain amount of time. This used to be fifteen years, but was changed at the beginning of 
the 20th century to five years. However, because the Syndicate was applying for large plots of 
land, this legislation did not apply. Again, the Dutch press made a statement against this 
exemption. The Java-Bode wrote in February 1912 that: “[the] forthcoming attitude of mister 
Idenburg is not entirely correct, since it should have been the same for all.”249 
An article published in the Batavian Newspaper (Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad) of 17 
January 1913 finally resulted in a reaction by the opposition in the Dutch House of 
Representatives and the Senate. It stated: “[Colijn and van Heutsz] have claimed the favours of 
senior officials, and indeed, by attitude and acting as chosen ones, they have moved more than 
one senior official to cooperate, in a way which others would not dare to hope for. That is the 
moral disadvantage of the land syndicate.” and ended: “The colonial government should think 
carefully about the actions of the Dutch East India Land Syndicate.”250 However, no action was 
taken by the Dutch Government, and the Syndicate was allowed to continue its practises. But, 
when Colijn got involved with a similar situation eight years, the exceptional position of the 
Syndicate was again revisited.  
 
Henri van Kol’s pamphlet  
The accusations made against Colijn are summarized in a pamphlet with the same title as the 
name of Syndicate, ‘Het Nederlands-Indisch Land-Syndicaat’. It was written by Henri van Kol 
in 1921. Van Kol was one of the founders of the Social Democratic Labour Party (Sociaal-
Democratische Arbeiderspartij), founded in 1894. He became a member of the House of 
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Representatives in 1897, when the party won its first two seats during the elections.251 Failing 
to get re-elected in 1909, he joined the Senate in 1913, where he would remain until 1924.252 
Just as Colijn, van Kol became the East-Indies specialist for his party. He had been studying 
the Dutch East Indies for a long period of time, and was an investor and plantation owner.253 
The main argument in the pamphlet is that Colijn, along with Van Heutsz and Idenburg, 
used their position as former elected officials to gain benefits for themselves or the companies 
for which they were working. In short, there was a conflict of interest between business and 
politics. He provides two examples to support his argument. The first is the way Colijn lobbied 
the Minister of Colonies and Governor-General for exemptions for the Syndicate. The second 
is the role he played in what would be known as ‘the Jambi-scandal’. 
Before it was named a scandal, it was known as the Jambi-case, which lasted from 
roughly 1903 to 1923. Jambi, a residence located north of Palembang (map 1) and known for 
its oil prospects, was opened for private exploitation in 1903, after it was deemed safe when the 
Aceh war and its aftermath had passed. Within two years, the Dutch East India Government 
received and overwhelming amount of petitions, it became impossible to make a selection. The 
Mining Law of 1899 determined that concessions should be provided on the grounds of “first 
come, first served”, but the government suspected that there were many speculators among the 
applicants. Therefore, newly appointed Governor-General van Heutsz decided to close the area 
for private investors, and to conduct a research on the prospects. The results came in 1906 with 
the daunting result that more prospects were found, which made the area even more attractive 
to private investors. The Mining Law, however, determined that the Dutch State had priority 
over all others to exploit the area.254 Because of this, the government had adopted a new clause 
in the Mining Law when Jambi was reopened for private exploitation in 1912. This clause added 
that, if crude oil was found, a concession was not automatically granted as a possible 
participation of the State had to be previously negotiated.255 
The cabinet crisis of 1913 and the outbreak of the First World War overshadowed the 
importance of the Jambi-case and the area remained closed for private investors.256 When the 
debates on the Jambi oil fields reopened in 1919, the Dutch East India Government had received 
6.617 petitions. The original dissuasive intent of the 1912 clause apparently did not deter private 
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investors. Negotiating state participation in every individual case was bound to cost a significant 
amount of time and effort. For that reason, the government decided to set up a joint venture 
between a private company and the state. This company, already proposed by van Heutsz in 
1906, was to be led by the state as main participant and was created as the Dutch East India 
Petroleum Company (Nederlandsch-Indische Aardolie Maatschappij, N.I.A.M.) in a joint 
venture with a private company. Petitioners for the concessions in Jambi were forced to offer 
part of their future earnings to the state to even be considered for the bid. The winner turned 
out to be the Royal Dutch Shell, which offered 50% of its future earnings to the State. A joint 
venture was set up between the newly founded N.I.A.M. and the B.P.M., the Royal Dutch’s 
subsidiary company responsible for the exploitation of oil fields.257 
 A year before the decision on a joint venture, T.B. Pleyte had resigned as Minister of 
Colonies. His successor was Idenburg, and it was Colijn who took van Heutsz’s plan for his 
consideration. Colijn, at that time managing director of the B.P.M. and leader of the Anti-
Revolutionary Party, argued that the joint venture between the state and the B.P.M. would 
support and reinforce the ‘Dutch’ interest in the Royal Dutch Shell.258 Idenburg agreed, and 
decided to work out van Heutsz’s plan together with Colijn. A year later however, Idenburg 
had to resign because of health problems. Colijn was the forced to go to S. de Graaff, Idenburg’s 
successor and Colijn’s close friend. However, this turn, Colijn stressed the need to grant B.P.M. 
priority on all concessions in the whole Archipelago. De Graaf decided to accept Colijn’s 
request and added this clause, under article 26, to the draft of the bill. 259 
The legislative proposal on the joint venture was discussed in April 1921. The text of 
the proposal was not made public, and therefore members of the House of Representatives were 
only able to briefly view the document. One member of the House and fellow party member of 
van Kol’s, saw article 26 and confronted de Graaff. Article 26 was supposed to remain a secret, 
and so the only response de Graaff was able to manage is that the article was ‘simply a mistake’. 
Despite this, the proposal was adopted by both the House of Representatives and the Senate.260  
The adoption of the proposal had direct consequences for almost every party involved. 
Because de Graaff had tried to keep article 26 a secret, he became known as Simon the Liar. 
According to the Dutch press, the government had willingly and knowingly handed over power 
to the B.P.M. and the Royal Dutch and dubbed ‘the Jambi-scandal’ as a corruption affair. 
Furthermore, it resulted in a growing resentment among the people against the Royal Dutch. It 
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became known as the embodiment of ‘sinful capitalism’, which used every way possible to 
strengthen its position.261 
Colijn’s involvement in the whole affair came soon to light and the Jambi-scandal turned 
into the ‘Colijn-scandal’. He had persuaded an elected minister to work out the plan for the joint 
venture when he was managing director of the B.P.M. and had just become managing director 
for the Royal Dutch when the proposal was adopted. Meanwhile, he was the chairman of the 
A.R.P., and a former minister of war. In short: “As former official in the Dutch East Indies and 
now an influential politician in the Netherlands, Colijn had abused his position to benefit 
himself in the most exasperating way”.262 According to van Kol, men like Colijn were the cause 
of a rotting system. A system that exploited not only the local population of the Archipelago, 
but also the Dutch people, for the greater good of colonial capitalism.263 In his pamphlet he 
stated: “[I shall] continue to go straight to the heart of the problem, so that this cancer shall be 
cut out of our political lives.”264 As a result, the Dutch population accused Colijn of partiality 
and started to see him as an imperialist capitalist who made millions at the expense of Dutch 
common interest. Furthermore, the Royal Dutch Shell decided to terminate his contract as 
managing director in 1922, two years earlier than expected.265  
 While his involvement with the Jambi-affair had direct consequences for his position 
within the Royal Dutch, it did not have implications for his position within the Syndicate. Even 
though he had become Minister of War from 1911 to 1913, he still remained an active director 
of the company.266 He was still actively participating in the Syndicate as a commissioner while 
he was director of the B.P.M. and leader of the A.R.P. Only when he became prime minister he 
resigned as commissioner of the Syndicate.267 
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Conclusion 
Marinus and Colijn must have been satisfied on the evening of 5 August 1910. Their plan for a 
new private company with a national purpose had finally come to a reality. They had managed 
to tie important people, the directors of the N.H.M. and the Royal Dutch Shell, to their idea. 
Furthermore, they had the full cooperation of the Minister of Colonies, as well as the Governor-
General of the Dutch East Indies. Within a couple years, the Syndicate was to become a 
‘powerful Dutch company’, just as they had intended.  
What followed was a period of setbacks and slow progress, exactly the opposite of what 
Colijn and Marinus had expected. The minister of colonies and governor-general were not able 
to keep their promise, and the Syndicate had not received the necessary legislative exemptions. 
Furthermore, they were forced to expand their stock capital, driving the company onto the hand 
of a foreign shareholder the Rothschilds. By 1916, the Syndicate owned three plantations, of 
which two were purchased, and roughly 18.000 hectares of concessions. 
Change was of the essence was the Syndicate to achieve its portrayed goals. By the end 
of 1917, the Rothschilds and its commissioners, along with two directors of the Royal Dutch 
Shell, had left the company. A second director and a secretary of the N.H.M. were appointed to 
keep Marinus in check. The N.H.M. gained a contract to store and sell goods produced by the 
Syndicate, and the original goal was back in sight. Investment in already existing plantations 
stopped and attention turned to the new concessions and their cultivation. Results were directly 
visible: the Syndicate opened three plantations on their own concessions, with another seven to 
be opened in the next three years. However, the meaning of a syndicate, which is a group of 
individuals and/or organizations combined to promote a common interest, had disappeared. It 
had become nothing more than the name of the company. 
The value of the company quadrupled within seven years, from a little over ƒ6.000.000,- 
in 1917 to ƒ26.000.000,- in 1924. However, the plantations turned out to be unprofitable and 
the cultivating concessions was very expensive, resulting in yearly losses for the Syndicate. 
Again, a wave of changes was imminent. With Colijn and Loudon leaving as commissioners, 
van Aalst made sure that the Syndicate fully came under control of the N.H.M. The Supervisory 
Board was changed to a Board of Directors, the possessions of the Syndicate were consolidated, 
and unused concessions were given back to government. After Marinus passed away in 1930, 
the Syndicate became a subsidiary company of the N.H.M, roughly two decades after its 
inception. 
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The founding of the Syndicate brought with it a national promise. A large and powerful 
Dutch company was to be created, which would give a boost to the exploitation uncultivated 
lands in the Archipelago forming thus a strong counterweight to the presence of large foreign 
companies in the Dutch East Indies. In order to achieve these goals the Syndicate had the 
ambition of cultivating concessions, of exploiting and managing plantations and of investing in 
other companies. As a result the Syndicate would not only become a private entrepreneurial 
success, but also serve a national purpose. However Colijn, founder, director and commissioner 
of the company, was brought into disrepute by the Dutch House of Representatives and the 
Senate. The Syndicate had to manage not only the financial and economic aspects of a company 
with an idealistic background, but also deal with the political uproar it had created. 
Whether or not the Syndicate was able to manage this confluence of goals and interests 
stood at the core of this thesis. In chapter 1, the analysis of the financial and idealistic setup of 
the company lead me to conclude that the majority of the company’s shareholders and 
commissioners remained Dutch, although when the stock capital had to be raised to 
ƒ10.000.000,-, the largest investor was a foreigner. After 1917, the Syndicate did become Dutch 
again, but the Syndicate became fully dependent on loans provided by the N.H.M and was 
practically subdued to a subsidiary company after 1927. In terms of management, the Syndicate 
failed to become a powerful Dutch National company, as Colijn and Marinus had foreseen. 
In chapter 2, I demonstrate that the company had applied for roughly 500.000 hectares 
of concessions in seven different regencies by 1910. Thirteen years later, it had only received 
roughly ten percent, or c. 48.500 hectares. For this reason, the Board decided to consolidate its 
assets and stopped applying for new concessions. Concessions that were deemed worthless 
were given back to the government and only nine were successfully turned into functioning 
plantations, and of those only six were sold at a profit. The Syndicate failed thus to receive and 
manage vast amounts of concessions and turn them into plantations. 
The last chapter makes an incursion into the crossing paths of politics and imperial 
capitalism. The Syndicate tried to use the network of its elite commissioners for benefits, 
privileges and exemptions. Colijn and Marinus were able to get positive responses mostly of 
ministers in The Hague, but they failed to convince the Council of the Indies or the Governor 
General. The Syndicate was the forced to become and ordinary company like all others. In this 
process, the ethics and morality of men like Colijn were questioned in the political arena and in 
the press, although with little consequence for the individuals involved or the promoted policies.  
In short, the Syndicate was unable to manage the confluence of the financial/economic, 
idealistic and political goals as proposed at its outset. Financially, it had to rely on foreign 
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investment to take off and later on a subsidiary position to a larger firm. The company was 
unable to make a profit and break away with its creditors, as profit was only attained in four out 
of twenty two years. It also failed to provide a boost to the exploitation of vast amounts of land 
and help Dutch government and presence in the Archipelago. However, the Syndicate was able 
to stimulate the local economy through linkages and spillovers. These extended to the 
government of the Dutch East Indies, who were able to attain large plots of land ready to be 
exploited by other companies. 
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a. Maps 
 Map 1. First requests for concessions in the Archipelago 
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Map 2a. Plantations in the regency of Simalungun, residency of East Sumatra 
Map 2b. Plantations in the residency of Palembang 
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Map 2c. Plantations in the residency of Bencoolen 
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Map 3a. Concessions in the regency of Simalungun, residency of East Sumatra 
Map 3b. Concessions in the residency of Palembang 
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Map 3c. Concessions in the residency of Bencoolen 
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b. Figures 
 
  
  
Figure 1. Amount of hectares planted per crop between 1911 and 1940 
Figure 2. Value of plantations and concessions in guilders between 1911 and 1938 
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Figure 3. The Syndicate’s profits and losses in guilders on the between 1916 and 1938 
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Table 1. Total amount of productive hectares per product per year, 1911-1940 
 
c. Tables
 
  
Year Coffee Rubber Tea Cinchona Palm oil Total 
1911 85 300       385 
1912 443 336       779 
1913 585 478 61     1124 
1914 873 887 280     2040 
1915 1249 1106 460   22 2837 
1916 1551 1354 902   22 3829 
1917 1702 1449 827   22 4000 
1918 2111 1611 1374   22 5118 
1919 2387 1760 1789   22 5958 
1920 3351 2211 2288 4 319 8173 
1921 3567 2318 2561 150 319 8915 
1922 3947 2393 2780 150 457 9727 
1923 4200 2508 2987 215 607 10517 
1924 4203 2508 3001 221 607 10540 
1925 2904 2853 3036 269 607 9669 
1926 2045   3170 269 585 6069 
1927 2048   3424 291 585 6348 
1928 2023   4145 291 638 7097 
1929 2003   4307 305 877 7492 
1930 1983   5216 288 1251 8738 
1931 1833   5424 330 1284 8871 
1932 1563   5424 289 1295 8571 
1933 1442   5424 286 1295 8447 
1934 1506   5424 337 1295 8562 
1935 1506   5422 337 1295 8560 
1936 1513   5398 335 1287 8533 
1937 1515   5629 335 1438 8917 
1938 1060   5629 352 1698 8739 
1939 1060   5629 352 1738 8779 
1940 1060   5629 352 1738 8779 
Source: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11730, 11732, 11733, 11960, 11981 
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Year Kerasaän B. Bajoe B.Siantar P. Karit P. Danau A. Simpang Total 
1911 85           85 
1912 443           443 
1913 443 142         585 
1914 588 285         873 
1915 704 545         1249 
1916 802 701 48      1551 
1917 787 686 203 26     1702 
1918 778 629 558 146     2111 
1919 778 629 801 179     2387 
1920 838 729 796 396 221 371 3351 
1921 1489 874   442 337 425 3567 
1922 1528 1039   448 453 479 3947 
1923 1528 1083   488 568 533 4200 
1924 1528 1083   491 568 533 4203 
1925 933 44   633 636 658 2904 
1926       658 708 679 2045 
1927       634 735 679 2048 
1928       640 732 651 2023 
1929       640 712 651 2003 
1930       620 712 651 1983 
1931       600 654 579 1833 
1932       520 1043  1563 
1933       520 482 440 1442 
1934       584 482 440 1506 
1935       584 482 440 1506 
1936       596 479 438 1513 
1937       596 481 438 1515 
1938       596 464   1060 
1939       596 464   1060 
1940       596 464   1060 
Source : NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11730, 11732, 11733, 11960, 11981 
Table 2. Amount of productive hectares of coffee per plantation per year, 1911-1940 
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Year Kerasaän B. Bajoe B. Siantar A. Temam Total 
1911 300       300 
1912 336       336 
1913 336 142     478 
1914 466 421     887 
1915 561 545     1106 
1916 642 679 33   1354 
1917 642 712 95   1449 
1918 642 712 257   1611 
1919 642 712 406   1760 
1920 645 812 495 259 2211 
1921 705 1200   413 2318 
1922 705 1200   488 2393 
1923 705 1200   603 2508 
1924 705 1200   603 2508 
1925 705 1200   948 2853 
 
 
 
Year P. Danau B. Kaba Total 
1919     0 
1920   4 4 
1921   150 150 
1922   150 150 
1923   215 215 
1924   221 221 
1925   269 269 
1926   269 269 
1927   291 291 
1928   291 291 
1929   305 305 
1930   288 288 
1931   330 330 
1932   289 289 
1933   286 286 
1934   337 337 
1935   337 337 
1936   335 335 
1937   335 335 
1938 17 335 352 
1939 17 335 352 
1940 17 335 352 
 
Source: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11730, 11732, 11960, 11981 
Table 4. Amount of productive hectares of cinchona per plantation per year, 1919-1940 
 
Source: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11730, 11732, 11733, 11960, 11981 
 
Table 3. Amount of productive hectares of rubber per plantation per year, 1911-1925 
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Year B. B. Oeloe P. Ratoes Permanangan Bah Aliran H. Oeloe B. Boetong Total 
1913 61           61 
1914 280           280 
1915 460           460 
1916 645 257         902 
1917 549 278         827 
1918 714 382 278       1374 
1919 714 575 500       1789 
1920 714 719 658 197     2288 
1921 742 740 729 350     2561 
1922 770 762 820 428     2780 
1923 797 792 901 497     2987 
1924 801 792 918 490     3001 
1925 801 796 949 490     3036 
1926 845 803 996 526     3170 
1927 845 803 996 586 194   3424 
1928 845 803 996 680 821   4145 
1929 845 803 996 680 983   4307 
1930 845 803 996 680 983 909 5216 
1931 853 823 996 680 993 1079 5424 
1932 1533 823 996     2072 5424 
1933 1533 823 996     2072 5424 
1934 1533 823 996     2072 5424 
1935 1533   1817     2072 5422 
1936 1533   1806     2059 5398 
1937 1587   1915     2127 5629 
1938 1587   1915     2127 5629 
1939 1587   1915     2127 5629 
1940 1587   1915     2127 5629 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11730, 11732, 11733, 11960, 11981 
 
 
Table 5. Amount of productive hectares of tea per plantation per year, 1913-1940 
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Year Bah Bajoe B. Siantar T. Pingin Total 
1915 22     22 
1916   22   22 
1917   22   22 
1918   22   22 
1919   22   22 
1920   22 297 319 
1921 22   297 319 
1922 22   435 457 
1923 22   585 607 
1924 22   585 607 
1925 22   585 607 
1926     585 585 
1927     585 585 
1928     638 638 
1929     877 877 
1930     1251 1251 
1931     1284 1284 
1932     1295 1295 
1933     1295 1295 
1934     1295 1295 
1935     1295 1295 
1936     1287 1287 
1937     1438 1438 
1938     1698 1698 
1939     1738 1738 
1940     1738 1738 
 
 
Source: NL-HaNA, 2.20.01, inv.nr. 11730, 11732, 11733, 11960, 11981 
 
Table 6. Amount of productive hectares of palm oil per plantation per year, 1915-1940 
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